Warp, Weft, and Way

Chinese and Comparative Philosophy 中國哲學與比較哲學

Two Concepts of Roles

There are many images and metaphors that might serve as cores of conceptions of something for which one could use the English word “role.”  One way to look for some is to look at words from other languages.  I’ll look here at two, one from Greek and one from old Chinese.

Continue reading “Two Concepts of Roles”

June 15, 2017 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Comparative philosophy, Ethical Theory, Roger Ames, Role Ethics | 5 comments

Please Send Help on Citations

At Steve’s request I have agreed to help prepare a guidance “page” on how to cite Chinese philosophy-related texts (classical and post-classical), and how to use the citations you see.  But I don’t know much about that, so please send help!

Continue reading “Please Send Help on Citations”

June 11, 2017 Posted by | Blog details, Publishing, Resources | 3 comments

The Roots of a Reading

Here and there I have argued that Confucius did not think family virtue is the root of ren 仁; far from it. In defense of that claim I’ll now try to answer the question: how then do so many scholars think he did?

Continue reading “The Roots of a Reading”

August 5, 2016 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Confucius, Filial piety, Roger Ames | 6 comments

Analects 1.6, and how Confucius envisioned moral progress

Confucius’ remark at Analects 1.6 is often cited to show that he thought proper moral development begins with filial piety and then extends that attitude to ever-larger groups of people (ever less intensely).  I shall argue that the remark does not display such a view.  Confucius did not in general envision moral progress as extension.

Continue reading “Analects 1.6, and how Confucius envisioned moral progress”

July 29, 2016 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Confucianism, Confucius, Education Models, Filial piety, Moral Psychology, Ritual, Roger Ames, Self-Cultivation, Virtue | 4 comments

Confucius on the family as model

Many hold that for Confucius the family is the model for organized political society in some sense; that Confucius regarded the norms for relations beyond the family as largely based on the norms for relations with kin.  Here I follow Joseph Chan in challenging that view.

Continue reading “Confucius on the family as model”

June 17, 2016 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Confucianism, Confucius, Filial piety, Roger Ames, Role Ethics | 22 comments

The meaning of Analects 2.21

Someone said to Confucius, “Master, why don’t you engage in government?” The Master said, “The Book of Documents says, ‘Filial! But be filial, and a friend to your brothers, thus contributing to government.’ Why then do that other kind of ‘engaging in government’?”

或謂孔子曰:「子奚不為政?」子曰:「《》云:『孝乎惟孝、友于兄弟,施於有政。』是亦為政,奚其為為政?」

I’ll suppose for the sake of argument that the reported exchange is authentic, and argue that it is not significant evidence of Confucius’ views.  Confucius is not aiming to communicate his views here.

Continue reading “The meaning of Analects 2.21”

May 27, 2016 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Chinese Texts, Confucianism, Confucius, Filial piety, Politics, Roger Ames, Role Ethics | 7 comments

Is Analects 1.2 about family?

Here are some reasons to think that Youzi did not regard family as the root of humanity or of the Way.  (I used to think he did.)

Most of my argument focuses on defending a view held by Soothill, Leys, Chin, and maybe Lau and Slingerland: that by 弟 in Analects 1.2, Youzi meant elder-respect, a virtue commonly associated specifically with life outside the family.  It would follow that according to 1.2, only one of the two parts of the root of humanity is specifically a family virtue.  If 孝 and 弟 have something relevantly in common for Youzi, family isn’t it.

Continue reading “Is Analects 1.2 about family?”

May 16, 2016 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Chinese Texts, Confucianism, Confucius, Education Models, Filial piety, Moral Psychology, Roger Ames, Role Ethics, Ruism, Self-Cultivation | 22 comments

Did Confucius think our virtues are contagious?

Did Confucius think that if one of us has general virtue, or some particular virtue such as courage or filial piety, that general or particular virtue will have a substantial tendency to spread directly to the people around her, even if she holds no government position?

Here I’ll survey Confucius’ statements in the Analects and conclude that the answer is No. Confucius probably did not hold that view.  (I gave the opposite reading in both my published papers on Chinese philosophy.)

Continue reading “Did Confucius think our virtues are contagious?”

May 9, 2016 Posted by | Analects, Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Chinese Texts, Confucianism, Confucius, Filial piety, Moral Psychology, Political Theory, Virtue | 23 comments

EACP inaugural conference in Vilnius

The inaugural biennial conference of the European Association for Chinese Philosophy will be held in Vilnius in early June.  Keynote speakers Carine Defoort and Peng Guoxiang. Deadlines and other information on the EACP web site:

http://www.oc.vu.lt/en/eacp2016

October 19, 2015 Posted by | Call for Papers (CFP), Conference, Opportunities, Organization News | no comments

"When two go together"

This post proposes a book project, for anyone who wants it.

Two kinds of serious conversation

By “serious” conversations I mean conversations that work toward knowledge (at least for one party), or good decision (at least by one party), or designing something complex.

The serious conversations glimpsed in the Analects are mainly between a master and student. The Mencius is more concerned with how an adept should counsel a king. 1A7 looks like a handbook for that.

These two kinds of conversation get their shape and point from inequalities: unequal wisdom and unequal power. Between master and student, one side has the wisdom and the power. Between counselor and king, one side has the wisdom and the other has the power. The point of both conversations, as understood by all parties, is to transmit  some wisdom from the wiser party to the other — within constraints imposed by the powerful party, such as limited time.

One could do a study of these two forms of conversation in Confucian literature: the varieties of each and the guidance on how to do them well. That’s not my main proposal here.

Is it fair to say that when early Confucianism thought about serious conversation, these two are the main kinds it thought about?

Diomedean conversation

The Western tradition saliently values another kind of conversation, aiming more at discovering or creating than transmitting. Continue reading “"When two go together"”

September 19, 2012 Posted by | Chinese philosophy - 中國哲學 - 中国哲学, Comparative philosophy, Confucianism, Democracy, Education Models, Role Ethics | 4 comments