Yong Huang writes:
The editorial board of Dao has just finished the selection of 2015 Dao Annual Best Essay Award. Professor David Wong’s paper, “Early Confucian Philosophy and Development of Compassion” (Dao 14.2: 157-194), wins the award. Congratulations, David!
The paper is now set for free access at this link: Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of Compassion The following is its official citation:
The article from the current issue of Dao that we have chosen for discussion is Michael Slote’s “The Philosophical Reset Button: A Manifesto,” available via open-access here. This time around, we offer opening comments from both BAI Tongdong of Fudan University, and myself (Steve Angle). Those comments follow here, and let the discussion begin!
The latest issue of Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy has been published. We will continue our series of sponsoring discussion of an article from each issue; this time, we have chosen Michael Slote’s “The Philosophical Reset Button: A Manifesto.” It will be set to open-access, and within a week or so we will have a post announcing that the discussion is open. To whet your appetite, here is the abstract:
Our regular series discussing articles from the journal Dao will continue in a couple days; Anne Behnke Kinney of the University of Virginia has prepared a set of comments on Pauline Lee’s “Two Confucian Theories on Children and Childhood” (which appeared in the latest issue of Dao), and we will post Kinney’s comments on Thursday. Per our agreement with the journal, that article has been set Open Access, so everyone can freely download it. Please take a look, and join in the discussion (starting Thursday).
The latest in our series of discussion pieces on recent articles published in Dao, here we have Howard Curzer (Texas Tech), an Aristotle sepcialist who has also developed an interest in early Confucianism, commenting on Thorian Harris’s essay. For Harris’s piece, click here.
CONVERGENCE
Harris begins by combining and fleshing out Aristotle’s scattered, elliptical remarks about the sense of shame in an admirably charitable and plausible way….
With each published issue of Dao, we choose one article for discussion here on Warp, Weft, and Way, and Dao‘s publisher gives everyone free access to the article for a year. The next article to get this treatment is “Aristotle and Confucius on the Socioeconomics of Shame” by Thorian Harris. The article can be accessed here. Howard Curzer of Texas Tech is going to start off the discussion in a couple weeks with a précis; in the meantime, we encourage you to download and read the article, and then join in the discussion when it begins.
We continue our collaboration with the journal Dao to present featured discussions of a newly published article, available for free download here (link has been fixed). For this edition, Ruth Chang (Rutgers University) has graciously agreed to introduce and share her thoughts about “Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?” by Ralph Weber (University of Zurich). Ruth Chang’s discussion — and discussion-starter we hope — is here, below. Please feel welcome to join in.
(Moved to top for article discussion as a featured post – March 12, 2014)
The latest issue of Dao has been released. And in keeping with our new collaboration with the journal, one article has been set to free access:
Filial Obligations: A Comparative Study, by Cecilia Wee
Well, first, I have to thank Cecilia Wee for the very stimulating piece. I hope I have not misunderstood or misrepresented too much of it in the following remarks. I look forward to her comments and discussion by all.
Cheers,
Manyul
As Steve and Manyul announced last month, with each new issue of Dao the blog will host a discussion of one of the issue’s articles, and the journal will make that article freely available online. Here I’m kicking off the series with a discussion of Loy Hui-chieh’s “On the Argument for Jian’ai” (Dao 12.4, available here).
Loy’s article treats the Mohists’ main argument for inclusive care (jiān ài 兼愛), focusing on the role played in it by appeals to virtues such as filial piety that are inevitably partial. Fundamental to his treatment is the view (which I share) that inclusive care did not require absolute impartiality—it did not imply that we have equal obligations to all people, or that we should treat them the same, or feel the same about them. Loy thus undermines one common sort or argument against the Mohists, that inclusive care is incompatible with the partial virtues and is therefore morally dubious. However, this does not mean that the Mohists’ own appeals to the partial virtues succeed, and Loy goes on to argue that they do not. I’ll sketch Loy’s argument, and then make critical comments on two points.
