Here is a link to my paper “Impartiality in the Ancient Root: Two Concepts of Xiàotì.“
(This paper is a correction and improvement of parts of a paper I posted on June 12, 2025.)
Abstract:
Here is a link to my paper “Impartiality in the Ancient Root: Two Concepts of Xiàotì.“
(This paper is a correction and improvement of parts of a paper I posted on June 12, 2025.)
Abstract:
This episode examines the Mohist doctrine of impartial caring (jian’ai 兼愛) via two arguments in the Mozi — the Caretaker Argument and the Filial Piety Argument. We examine the arguments’ logical structure, the psychological plausibility, and practical applicability. We also discuss the importance of reciprocity and competing interpretations of “impartial caring,” from the less demanding don’t-harm-anyone interpretation to stronger equal-concern readings, setting them against the Confucian model of care-with-distinctions (graded love). We also consider what genuine filiality requires and how different moral frameworks shape familial and social practices. Continue reading →
Confucianism is well known for prioritizing familial responsibilities and love over other competing demands such as public interest or duties to the state. In this episode we explore two of the best known passages from early Confucianism that some modern scholars believe makes Confucianism morally problematic. The first passage we discuss is the “Upright Gong” passage, Analects 13.18, which has Confucius advocating mutual “covering up” of crimes by fathers and sons. The second passage is Mengzi 7A35, in which Mengzi is asked what the sage king Shun would have done if his father had committed murder. Mengzi’s answer, briefly stated, is that Shun would have given up his throne and would have fled with his father to care for him for the rest of his life.
Through these passages we explore questions about justice, consequentialist ethics, and the nature of moral dilemmas (and Confucian ways of handling them). Continue reading →
Hello all,
I will be giving a talk on the future of Confucianism in America at the San Francisco City Library on Sunday, September 29. It will be on the third floor at 1:30pm. All are welcome.
This post expands a question I asked once in the old Discussions section.
It is sometimes said that the (or a) Ruist picture of moral psychology stresses family because Ruists stress the development of moral sensibilities starting with people’s earliest relationships, which are their childhood relationships at home. So … what about household servants?
Here are three different ideas:
Idea #2 is very abstract, and can be understood simply in terms of order versus disorder, or natural respect versus the lack of it. Idea #3 contemplates a variety of kinds of stable order, and perhaps a variety of forms of government.
Where might idea #3 appear in the Chinese tradition?
Palgrave Macmillan has published P. Steven Sangren, Filial Obsessions: Chinese Patriliny and Its Discontents. A work of anthropology, but it looks to have much to say to philosophers interested in issues related to filial piety. More information here.
Confucius’ remark at Analects 1.6 is often cited to show that he thought proper moral development begins with filial piety and then extends that attitude to ever-larger groups of people (ever less intensely). I shall argue that the remark does not display such a view. Confucius did not in general envision moral progress as extension.
Many hold that for Confucius the family is the model for organized political society in some sense; that Confucius regarded the norms for relations beyond the family as largely based on the norms for relations with kin. Here I follow Joseph Chan in challenging that view.