What is the nature and source of morality? Are human beings naturally inclined toward moral goodness? The early Confucian thinker Mencius (Mengzi) believed that human beings by nature possessed certain moral sprouts that could be nurtured and developed into robust virtues. In this episode we explore Mencius’s account of these moral sprouts, examining both philosophical and psychological justifications for their existence.
Featured passage
Mencius 2A6, The Child at the Well:
[1] 孟子曰：「人皆有不忍人之心。先王有不忍人之心，斯有不忍人之政矣。以不忍人之心，行不忍人之政，治天下可運之掌上。
[1] Mencius said, “All humans have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others. The Former Kings had hearts that were not unfeeling toward others, so they had governments that were not unfeeling toward others. If one puts into practice a government that is not unfeeling toward others by means of a heart that is not unfeeling toward others, bringing order to the whole world is in the palm of your hand.
[2] 所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者，今人乍見孺子將入於井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心。非所以內交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。由是觀之，無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。
[2] “The reason why I say that all humans have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others is this. Suppose someone suddenly a child about to fall into a well: anyone in such a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion—not because one sought to get in good with the child’s parents, not because one wanted fame among one’s neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child’s cries.
[3] 惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。
[3] “From this we can see that if one is without the feeling of compassion [ceyin 惻隱], one is not human. If one is without the feeling of disdain [xiuwu 羞惡], one is not human. If one is without the feeling of deference [cirang 辭讓], one is not human. If one is without the feeling of approval and disapproval [shifei 是非], one is not human. The feeling of compassion is the sprout [duan 端] of benevolence. The feeling of disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The feeling of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety. The feeling of approval and disapproval is the sprout of wisdom.
人之有是四端也，猶其有四體也。有是四端而自謂不能者，自賊者也；謂其君不能者，賊其君者也。凡有四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始然，泉之始達。苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充之，不足以事父母。」
“People having these four sprouts is like their having four limbs. To have these four sprouts, yet to claim that that one is incapable (of virtue), is to steal from oneself. To say that one’s ruler is incapable is to steal from one’s ruler. In general, having these four sprouts within oneself, if one knows to fill them all out, it will be like a fire starting up, a spring breaking through! If one can merely fill them out, they will be sufficient to care for all within the Four Seas. If one merely fails to fill them out, they will be insufficient to serve one’s parents.”
(Mengzi 2A6, slightly modified from Bryan Van Norden’s translation)
Some terms and references mentioned in the episode
- Hallgeir Sjåstad and Roy F. Baumeister, “The Future and the Will: Planning requires self-control, and ego depletion leads to planning aversion” (influential article on “decision fatigue”)
- Zisi 子思 (perhaps Mencius’s teacher)
- Inglorious Basterds (film)
- Philippa Foot (the more recent philosopher that we keep mentioning)
- Eirik Lang Harris, “The Nature of the Virtues in Light of the Early Confucian Tradition” (response to Foot on behalf of Confucian virtue theory)
- Lei 類 (type, kind, natural kind)
- Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension” (chapter 8 of this book)
- Franklin Perkins, Doing What You Really Want
- Yong HUANG, Why Be Moral?
- Mencius 6A6
- Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (source of the phrases “system 1” and “system 2” to refer to different kinds of thinking)
- Richard Kim, Confucianism and the Philosophy of Well-Being
- xin 心 (heart, heart-mind, state-of-heartmind, feelings)
- qing 情 (later became a standard character for “feelings”)
- Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought
- Shifei zhi xin 是非之心 (the “feeling” or state-of-heart-mind of approval and disapproval)
- Owen Flanagan, The Geography of Morals (see chapters 3-5 on the moral sprouts and moral modules)
- Jonathan Haidt, Moral Foundations Theory
It’s perhaps interesting to compare Mengzi’s thought experiment of the child in the well with the ‘shallow pond’ thought experiment of Peter Singer (1972). It goes like this:
“On your way to work, you pass a small pond. Children sometimes play in the pond, which is only about knee-deep. The weather’s cool, though, and it’s early, so you are surprised to see a child splashing about in the pond.
As you get closer, you see that it is a very young child, just a toddler, who is flailing about, unable to stay upright or walk out of the pond. You look for the parents or babysitter, but there is no one else around. The child is unable to keep her head above the water for more than a few seconds at a time. If you don’t wade in and pull her out, she seems likely to drown.
Wading in is easy and safe, but you will ruin the new shoes you bought only a few days ago and get your suit wet and muddy. By the time you hand the child over to someone responsible for her, and change your clothes, you’ll be late for work. What should you do?”
Well, of course you should save the child. But Singer then argues that there is no difference between this child in need that you can directly see and any other child in need in the world that you will never see and know – but that you should none the less also try to save (by donating money).
Mengzi and Singer both use a similar thought experiment to motivate people to extend their ‘feeling of compassion’ 惻隱 to more and more people and ultimately to the whole world 天下. Mengzi’s story of the ox about to be slaughtered (1A 7) has a similar motive.
For Mengzi, the prime benefactor must be the king; for Singer, each of us earning substantially more than the global minimum should donate a large part of their income/capital. But as the king has the power to level out income differences, he can make the relatively rich make their contribution.
Singer takes just one single step from the intuitively plausible saving of the child in the pond to the obligation to save every child in any pond. The Confucian approach of gradually extending one’s circles of concern seems more compelling and smarter. To my mind, there is also the meaningful difference that the Mengzian approach is not confined to impersonal monetary transfers but keeps stressing the aspect of ‘feeling’. And then of course, concepts of ‘utility’ or ‘happiness’ are only secondary (cf. Mengzi 6A 10).
See for a discussion https://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2015/01/of-drowning-children-near-and-far-i/ and https://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2015/01/of-drowning-children-near-and-far-ii/.
Hm! How about this:
In each philosopher’s story there are these three points:
You feel compassion toward X
You do not feel compassion toward Y
There is no (relevant) difference between the cases.
What makes such a story a putative argument for extension rather than, say, contraction?
In Singer’s case it is the idea of objective importance, giving meaning to “relevant.”
In Mencius’ case the direct argument is for an ability (as a reply to an objection to semi-articulated argument for care, from what it takes to be a real or impressive king). What gives meaning to “relevant” seems to be assumptions about the psychology of ability.
I find it difficult to find mention of feelings in the Singer passage. The cited quote ends with the question of “What should you do?” The answer seems to be that you should save the drowning child. The answer does not seem to be that you should feel bad for the child or save the child from a feeling of compassion. Isn’t it more likely that Singer’s point is that, if you should act in this case, then you should correspondingly act in relevantly similar cases?
I think Singer also starts from an intuitive feeling. If there is no such intuition at all, we would all just walk by the pond. But he probably doesn’t stress this aspect because it is our feeling, and our being embodied in time and place that leads to our prioritizing of what we can directly feel and sense, which is necessarily bound to the direct environment. To have us extend our moral actions to people that we cannot see and ‘feel’ directly, Singer has to make a rational appeal to us to behave in a utilitarian/consequentialist manner. In this Singer resembles the Mohist propagation of ‘universal/inclusive love/care’ 兼愛. They also follow a consequentialist reasoning:
“Mozi said: Partiality is to be replaced by universality. But how is it that partiality can be replaced by universality? Now, when everyone regards the states of others as he regards his own, who would attack the others’ states? Others are regarded like self. When everyone regards the capitals of others as he regards his own, who would seize the others’ capitals? Others are regarded like self. When everyone regards the houses of others as he regards his own, who would disturb the others’ houses? Others are regarded like self. Now, when the states and cities do not attack and seize each other and when the clans and individuals do not disturb and harm one another — is this a calamity or a benefit to the world? Of course it is a benefit. When we come to think about the several benefits in regard to their cause, how have they arisen? Have they arisen out of hate of others and injuring others? Of course we should say no. We should say they have arisen out of love of others and benefiting others. If we should classify one by one all those who love others and benefit others, should we find them to be partial or universal? Of course we should say they are universal. Now, since universal love is the cause of the major benefits in the world, therefore Mozi proclaims universal love is right. And, as has already been said, the interest of the magnanimous lies in procuring benefits for the world and eliminating its calamities. Now that we have found out the consequences of universal love to be the major benefits of the world and the consequences of partiality to be the major calamities in the world; this is the reason why Mozi said partiality is wrong and universality is right.” (Mozi, book 16 兼愛下); translation W.P. Mei from ctext)
By the way, it is not the case that Mohists don’t allow for differences of degree in our concern for others (although they are depicted as such by Mengzi).
See for more info https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/#inclusive, paragraph 7.
How about this:
Singer isn’t talking about a feeling.
It kind of makes sense to think he is appealing to a feeling, insofar as he is addressing people who are thought to need the argument: people who he regards as having the right answer now about one case but not about the majority of similar cases, who (one might infer) are right about the one case not from principle, or not from the right principle. Singer might think: that feeling is a perception of moral truth; our perception of what is right in front of us is in general better than our perception of things far away.
Singer isn’t talking about a feeling, because he’s not talking about psychology at all; he’s talking about right and wrong.
Mencius vice versa, though his purely psychological point has moral relevance as defeating a moral argument that relies on a contrary psychological premise. If we’re moved by a similar moral argument (e..g. I don’t have to work like hell right now against the imminent collapse of nature and civilization, because I can’t care enough), Mencius’ point might have moral relevance for us as defeating our argument.
Singer has written about ethics and intuitions: Singer P. (2005). Ethics and intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9(3–4), 331–352. 10.1007/s10892-005-3508-y
Utilitarians appeal to a contrast between cool logic and misguided intuitions and emotions. They argue that common moral views have their source in gut reactions and intuitions shaped by discredited religious views or evolutionary pressures, and that careful reflection should lead us to abandon these views and endorse utilitarianism, a more logical view based in rational reflection.
This is all well and good, but recent research strongly suggests that ‘rational’ decision making without a role for emotion is a nonstarter – literally, because without emotions to motivate and push us, we would be passive. Utilitarians ignore the fact that we are embodied creatures; there is no hard dualism between body and mind. Already in 1994 neuroscientist Damasio in his book Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain, showed that reasoning requires the guidance of emotions and feelings conveyed from the body and posited that rationality requires emotional input.
Viewed in that light, that of course can be contested, Mengzi is more on par with modern science than Singer.
See for an overview on emotions and decision-making, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotions_in_decision-making
I think one can overestimate the degree to which utilitarians think we should deliberate calculatively, from (a) their emphasis on theory and argument within the philosophical project of justifying a general account of ethics, (b) their interest in that project, and (c) their ongoing exasperation at the scope of the horrors it seems we could easily avert, an observation encouraged by their general theory. And although Bentham wrote very little in moral philosophy, he has a famous page or two on it in which his argument differs little from “Others disagree, so they’re being irrational.”
“You’d save the drowning toddler and there’s no difference, so…”
I think that argument is very naïve about how psychological and social reality – e.g. what it take to have character – necessarily shapes our moral reality – what it is reasonable to demand of ourselves and others.
I think, with others, that utilitarianism historically arose from the sentimentalist movement. Utilitarianism’s opponent Rawls wrote in the introduction to TJ,
“During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism. … We sometimes forget that the great utilitarians, Hume and Adam Smith, Bentham and Mill, were social theorists and economists of the first rank … We may follow [Sidgwick] in assuming, somewhat arbitrarily, that [the utilitarian tradition] begins with Shaftesbury’s An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit (1711) and Hutcheson’s An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil (1725).”
Of the utilitarian philosophers mentioned by Rawls, the earliest four—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith—were also the leading four figures in the “sentimentalist” movement in moral philosophy, which focused on analyzing ordinary human feeling as the way to understand moral concepts and the force of moral reasons. Smith’s great moral work is “A Theory of the Moral Sentiments.” As Charles Taylor says of this movement, “Now sentiments become normative. We find out what is right at least in part by coming to experience our normal sentiments” (Sources of the Self, p. 284). More recent champions of sentimentalism include Michael Slote, who is utilitarian enough.
I think the idea that well-ordered emotion is an integral part of the activity of reason, good thinking, is the usual view in the Western tradition of moral philosophy, and has been from the beginning.
There is another podcast about the ‘trembling ox’ that might be interesting:
https://www.historyofphilosophy.net/mengzi