A guest post by JeeLoo Liu
The Rise of Analytic Chinese Philosophy
JeeLoo Liu
The existence of Chinese philosophy has long been dismissed from both sides of the world. In the West, Hegel famously denied the presence of Chinese philosophy, focusing on the essential speculative nature of “philosophy” itself. Of Confucius, he wrote that Confucius was “only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom—one with whom there is no speculative philosophy.” Of the Daodejing, Hegel wrote: “If Philosophy has got no further than to such expression, it still stands on its most elementary stage. What is there to be found in all this learning?” (Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1). When Derrida visited China in 2001, he proclaimed that China “does not have any philosophy, only thought” on the grounds that “philosophy” is “something of European form.” This has since become a popular, if not the received, view in the Western philosophical world.
In China, many traditionalist Chinese scholars reject the terminology of “Chinese philosophy,” focusing instead on what counts as “Chinese.” They argue that “philosophy” is a borrowed word from the West; for the same reason, they reject the categorization of Chinese metaphysics, Chinese epistemology, Chinese ethics, Chinese philosophy of language, Chinese philosophy of mind, and the like. To these scholars, even Feng Youlan’s (1895-1990) groundbreaking A History of Chinese Philosophy in the early twentieth century has “contaminated” Chinese thought by introducing Western concepts into the narrative.
However, there are also people on both sides who refuse to accept stereotyped conceptions of “philosophy” or the regional essentialization of either “the West” or “Chinese.” Beginning in the 1980s, young Chinese philosophers enrolled in graduate programs in North America began to promote analytic engagement with Chinese philosophy. They were primarily trained in analytic philosophy, and they saw the merit of employing philosophical analysis in the elucidation of ancient Chinese thought. They aimed to “philosophize” Chinese thought, moving away from the Sinological tradition and focusing on philosophical problems rather than purely textual studies of ancient Chinese texts. These young philosophers organized philosophical societies for the promotion of Chinese philosophy, most notably the Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America (ACPA), founded in 1995, and the International Society of Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP), established in 2002. Through their joint efforts, more books, journal articles, and philosophical meetings on various topics in Chinese philosophy have gradually emerged. One notable trend that arose from this cohort of philosophers in North America is what has come to be called analytic Chinese philosophy, which, as Bo Mou (2006) puts it, “has formed up a collective enterprise with systematic efforts instead of some individual scholars’ personal projects.”
Generally speaking, by “analytic” I mean the methodological approach of philosophical analysis that emphasizes conceptual analysis, the formulation of arguments, the examination of basic assumptions, and the pursuit of clarity in language and rigor in reasoning. In a more historical sense, however, analytic philosophy refers to the tradition of Anglo-American philosophy developed in the early twentieth century. According to Neil Levy, analytic philosophy is essentially “a problem-solving activity,” and it builds theories in answer to problems. There is thus a “proliferation of subdisciplines which characterizes the discipline” (Levy 2003, 293). In other words, there are two ways in which work can count as analytic Chinese philosophy: through the use of the method of philosophical analysis, or through engagement with philosophical problems as they are framed in the subdisciplines of analytic philosophy.
Building on this distinction, analytic Chinese philosophy has two main objectives. One is to employ philosophical analysis to reconstruct ancient Chinese thought. With the analytic approach, Chinese philosophical terms are clearly defined and examined, and Chinese philosophical debates are critically assessed as instances of speculative argumentation. Readers do not need to master Chinese texts or know the intellectual lineage in China in order to learn about issues and views in Chinese philosophy. With these reconstructive approaches and clear writings in analytic Chinese philosophy, one can no longer charge Chinese philosophy with being vague or impenetrable.
A more specific orientation within this approach has been called the “constructive-engagement strategy” with Chinese philosophy by Bo Mou. Through constructive engagement across different philosophical traditions, both within and outside Chinese philosophy, scholars emphasize focusing on philosophical issues with the aim to “contribute to the contemporary development of philosophy” (Mou 2016). There are many comparative philosophical works that engage analytic philosophy with Chinese philosophy, and many efforts made by early leaders in analytic Chinese philosophy to bring about dialogues between Chinese philosophers and prominent analytic philosophers—most notably Donald Davidson, Ernest Sosa, Michael Slote, John Searle, Owen Flanagan, and A. P. Martinich.
Building on the constructive-engagement strategy, an even more important objective of analytic Chinese philosophy emerged, namely, to develop philosophical positions inspired by ancient Chinese philosophy. Philosophers working in this field tackle a variety of issues in analytic philosophy with ideas gleaned from the tradition of Chinese philosophy. New Chinese-inspired philosophical views have burgeoned over the years. In Confucian-inspired analytic metaethics and normative ethics, there are Confucian moral realism, Confucian virtue ethics, Confucian role ethics, Confucian care ethics, Confucian feminist ethics, Confucian robot ethics, Confucian moral exemplarship, Confucian partialist ethics, Confucian perfectionism, and so on. In Confucian-inspired analytic political philosophy, there are Confucian meritocracy, pragmatic Confucian democracy, Confucian liberalism, Progressive Confucianism, Confucian theories of rights, and the like. Other noteworthy developments include Neo-Confucian moral psychology, Confucian moral sentimentalism, Confucian partialist cosmopolitanism, Confucian virtue epistemology, Confucian theories of moral motivation, moral responsibility, and moral blame, Confucian social ontology, Confucian relational theories of the self, Xunzi’s philosophy of language and constructivism, Confucian qi-monism and qi-naturalism, the Yijing’s philosophy of time and change, and so on.
In Daoist-inspired analytic philosophy, there are Daoist moral anti-realism, Daoist philosophy of language, Daoist metaphysics, Daoist theories of nothingness and non-being, Daoist qi-monism, Daoist naturalism, Daoist environmental ethics, Daoist political philosophy, Daoist skepticism and relativism, Zhuangzian therapeutic skepticism, Daoist action theory, Daoist theories of agency—with many more topics newly emerging. Other established philosophical views include Mohist logic, Mohist consequentialism, Mohist pragmatism, Mohist philosophy of language, Legalist political philosophy, the School of Names’ philosophy of language and paradoxes, Buddhist virtue ethics, Buddhist philosophy of causation, Buddhist logic, Buddhist metaphysics of interdependence, Buddhist philosophy of time and change, Buddhist philosophy of emptiness, Buddhist philosophies of consciousness and mind, Huayan Buddhist holism, Buddhist philosophies of self and non-self—and the list goes on. The landscape of these Chinese-inspired analytic philosophical views is rapidly expanding, and it has no fixed boundaries or limitations.
Analytic Chinese philosophy is also on the rise in China. In March 2024, the School of Philosophy at Shanxi University launched the Center for Analytic Chinese Philosophy, the first research center in China to bear this title. The establishment of the Center resulted from the joint efforts of Linhe Han of Peking University, Jianhua Mei of Shanxi University, and Yi Jiang, who holds a special appointment at Shanxi University. Since 2021, Professor Yi Jiang has led a Major Project of the National Social Science Foundation of China entitled A Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy in China in the Twentieth Century. This project led to the first philosophical forum on analytic Chinese philosophy at Shanxi University in 2024, thereby inaugurating the Center for Analytic Chinese Philosophy. In June 2024, Shanxi University hosted the first international conference on the history of analytic Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century, which drew close to one hundred philosophers in attendance. Linhe Han, Yi Jiang, Jianhua Mei, and others have published articles in newspapers and journals such as Guangming Daily and Philosophical Trends, vigorously promoting research on analytic Chinese philosophy. The second philosophical forum on analytic Chinese philosophy was held at Shanxi University in October 2025. The Center for Analytic Chinese Philosophy will continue to promote analytic Chinese philosophy, with more forums, conferences, and book series planned for the near future. With the official establishment of the name “analytic Chinese philosophy,” it is time that we recognize analytic Chinese philosophy as a distinctive branch of both Chinese philosophy and analytic philosophy.
The rise of analytic Chinese philosophy is now an established fact. In light of these developments over the past forty years, it is no longer tenable for contemporary analytic philosophers to dismiss or question the existence of Chinese “philosophy.” Philosophy is activity-oriented, not a fixed ontological kind. We should no longer cling to an outdated essentialism about what “philosophy” is or to a backward-looking narrative about where philosophy is supposed to have originated.
Hear, hear!
However, let’s avoid reinventing the wheel at the same time. The rise of analytic Chinese philosophy is not the invention of Bo Mou, nor is it a matter of the last decades—creative engagements with the thought of Bertrand Russell, the Vienna Circle, and others (with the former staying in Beijing for a year) occurred already in the 1920s. Cf. e.g., the scholarship of Dr. Jan Vrhovski (The University of Edinburgh) and the forthcoming “Palgrave Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy in Pre-1949 China.” Let us remember and revive those long-obliterated figures, and build upon their efforts rather than overshadow their contributions with our allegedly pioneering ideas, no matter how needed.
I’m with you on that, Paul!
Thanks for the writing JeeLoo Liu.
The article mentions Hegel and Derrida, but somebody remember any explicit challenge to the characterization of Chinese “Philosophy” from the analytic (very broadly defined as in the article) tradition?
Thanks to JeeLoo for this insightful historical synopsis of analytic turns in the study of Chinese philosophy. For a variety of reasons, I think think we who work on Chinese texts should be methodological pluralists. But if that mixture of methodologies didn’t include some that are deeply committed to making clear and tractable the core views and the justifications for those views, the consequences would be tragic for the field and for the philosophical traditions that we cherish.
I have some challenges from an outsider.
The notion that “the Sinological tradition” ignores “philosophical problems” and engages in “purely textual studies of ancient Chinese texts” is as unworthy a mischaracterization as the ones by Hegel and Derrida. I see philosophers flinging little clods like this all the time, and it doesn’t impress your colleagues in other fields. You shouldn’t have to caricature other people’s work in order to justify your own.
Next, I don’t think Chinese philosophy needs to be “reconstructed,” or, if it does, that that’s the right term for what analytic philosophers are doing. One “reconstructs” something that is no longer present, such as the Proto-Indo-European language or the circumstances preceding a horrible shooting. Chinese philosophy has always been present. It’s there for anyone who wants to read–and always has been. Regardless, I really don’t think “reconstruction” is what analytic philosophers should claim they are trying to do. “Reconstruction” would mean trying to understand what the philosophical debates meant to the people who engaged in them, how they conceived of their own enterprise, etc., and analytic philosophy would be a highly anachronistic mode for that. What you guys are trying to do is approach Chinese philosophy from a particular disciplinary perspective, and see what can come of this engagement that is new and profitable. I’m glad you’re doing it–much of the work has indeed been new and profitable. But why misstate your own “main objectives”?
I agree with the first point, alas. The second point I’m less sure of, if only because “reconstruction” has a field-specific meaning in analytic philosophy: it means restating premises (explicit and implicit) and how they logically connect when mapping and assessing the propositional content of a give text or passage as clearly as possible (in accordance with standards of logical validity, soundness, and suchlike). This ideally makes hidden assumptions and truth conditions clear, so that one can then go on to ask whether present-day persons (or at least philosophers of a certain sort) might be compelled to agree with a given position.
Whether “reconstruction” is a bad word choice is another matter, but I take it as shorthand for “reconstructing arguments”, where this means arranging the propositional content in a certain way. (This might be better called “propositional mapping” than “reconstruction”?) The texts themselves seldom if ever arrange the propositional content in such a manner. It is the same thing one sees with the arguments of many philosophers in many traditions. It is nice to see efforts at getting a handle on the propositional content, even if they’ll always be contested (as especially in the case of my beloved Zhuangzi). (Much as G.A. Cohen’s efforts at analytically reconstructing the arguments of Marx are useful for getting a handle on, say, Marx’s theory of history.)
As for whether this exercise is anachronistic, that is probably true in a sense, but there is an important sense in which it seems irrelevant: the method (as with Cohen on Marx) is sometimes useful (as you duly note), even if it is not how the authors themselves argued. Something is lost if we artificially focus on the propositional content to the exclusion of the modes of argument employed in a given context (see criticism of so-called analytic Marxism by the late Robert Paul Wolff), but something is gained (again, as you duly note).
Some philosophers have distinguished the “history of ideas” from the “history of philosophy”, where the former takes “reconstruction” in the (perfectly reasonable) sense you use and the latter takes it in the narrow, technical sense I’m trying to draw out (however poorly). I think the Routledge Philosophers Series is a model of the history of philosophy in this anachronistic and narrow yet new and profitable sense. I would love to attempt a Zhuangzi volume in that style some day, and I increasingly read the best works of JeeLoo Liu, Chris Fraser, Bo Mou, David Wong (etc., etc.) as doing this sort of thing well. (Anyway, just my two cents, but this is perhaps another outsider perspective. I’m only hanging around because I have something akin to an autistic-spectrum hyperfixation on Zhuangzi that gives my life meaning it would otherwise lack.)
I’m with you on that, Paul!
@ JR Williams You may well be right that this is what’s meant by “reconstruction” in this context, but then think about all the pretenses embedded in that usage. At best “reconstructing the arguments” means “restating them in terms that analytic philosophers have been trained to deploy.” It also implies that the material may have some philosophical potential, but in its current state it’s not yet truly philosophical because the authors didn’t have the benefit of attending seminars where they would have learned how to formulate their arguments properly. Even more objectionably, it implies that nobody before current analytic philosophers ever analyzed the arguments of Chinese philosophy correctly because they simply didn’t have the right method. We can discount all their work in about the same way that we discount astrology … I’m sorry, to an outsider (who has long wondered how Western philosophers justify ignoring East Asian scholarship), calling this “reconstruction” seems highly colonial and self-congratulatory.
@ Paul R. Goldin I am generally sympathetic with what you’re saying, though there is at least one way it could be taken that I’m unsympathetic with.
On the one (less sympathetic) hand, I am not sure that translation into current intellectual idiom itself is highly colonial and self-congratulatory. But if it is, then the whole commentarial tradition on almost any text is highly colonial and self-congratulatory. (Was it highly colonial and self-congratulatory when Hanshan Deqing used “mind-only consciousness” to make sense of the “veritable mind” of Zhuangzi? Was it highly colonial and self-congratulatory when Wang Fuzhi used current philosophical vocabulary to interpret Zhuangzi? Was it highly colonial and self-congratulatory when Lin Yunming, Xuan Ying, and Liu Fengbao used the vocabulary of latter-day literary analysis to make sense of Zhuangzi? Was it highly colonial and self-congratulatory when Zhang Taiyan used “mind-only consciousness” to make sense of “Qiwu Lun”? What about when Bo Mou uses Davidson as a point of reference to make sense of Zhuangzi’s contemporary philosophical relevance?) It could be that translating texts into contemporary intellectual idiom is itself highly colonial and self-congratulatory, but that is not so obvious to me. (No one is saying this is the only proper way, as far as I can see.) Interpreters have always translated works into current intellectual idioms.
On the other (more sympathetic) hand, I do feel the force of your objection. One certainly doesn’t want to do something that seems highly colonial and self-congratulatory, and if translating into contemporary idiom itself fits that bill, then at the very least things might need to be framed more carefully.
More importantly (and more sympathetically), I’m perhaps speaking past you in framing it as a matter of “translation into current intellectual idiom” (what “reconstruction” is in effect doing) rather than focusing specifically on whether the word “reconstruction” has highly colonial and self-congratulatory connotations. As for its connotations, I’d gladly give up the word given that is what it suggests. (Against the historical background of colonialism, this is no small point!) I recognize that even if the practice is (at least sometimes) defensible, the terminology might carry problematic colonial overtones, especially when coupled with a certain attitude. So in the end, maybe I do agree with your point. (Again, just my two cents. Thanks for taking the time to reply.)
@Paul R. Goldin To put it more succinctly: you raise a good point, and I agree.
@ JR Williams What strikes me as colonial and self-congratulatory is calling it “reconstruction”—as well as the unwillingness to integrate one’s work with prior scholarship (more than 90% of which is written in East Asian languages) that always seems to accompany this “reconstructive” process. That’s tantamount to declaring: “We’ve arrived at the shores of Chinese philosophy, armed with our superior method. Let’s get to work!” But my views aren’t unknown, so I think I’ll stop here.
@ Paul R. Goldin Thanks for clarifying. Your concern is very clear. I agree that insufficient engagement with East Asian-language scholarship is a genuine shortcoming. Onward.