On September 9th at 20:30 Beijing time the 四海为学 Collaborative Learning Project will host our first event of the new academic year. It is a roundtable on “Studies and Translations of the Tsinghua Manuscripts.”
For details and the Zoom link please see our event page: https://www.sihaiweixue.org/tsinghua-manuscripts-roundtable
(Note that no pre-registration or passcode is required.)
Our events this fall have not been scheduled, but you can stay updated with our calendar here. Please feel free to advertise this or share it with anyone. All our events are free and open to everyone.
Sincerely,
Paul J. D’Ambrosio
Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul D’Ambrosio (the 四海为学 guy): “As academics, for instance, we not only check publication lists or citation metrics. From time to time, we still read an actual article or book. But often we cannot but read this article or book in the light of the author’s academic profile” (You and Your Profile, p. 40). | “Every academic, for instance, knows that we do not need to actually read our colleagues’ work to know about their academic stance and standing. We simply check where they published, whom they quote, and by whom they are quoted, and maybe we also look at their H-index (a numerical score indicating the impact of a scholar’s works based on counting how often they are cited) on their Google Scholar profile. As professional academics, we orient ourselves according to the conditions of systemic second-order observation. On its terms we identify one another just by looking at our academic profiles. The observation mode of today’s academics parallels that of contemporary theme park goers” (ibid.). | “The point is not just to be seen as virtuous but to be seen as being seen as virtuous. Value lies in the display of something that is regarded as right or good or virtuous. Personal virtue has to be visible in rankings, reviews, or comments for it to count. This is why moral communication is so crucial today” (ibid., p. 93). | “Is a moral cause good because it boosts my profile, or does a moral cause boost my profile because it is good? Do l identify with a moral stance because it suits my profile, or do l identify with a profile because it suits my moral stance? Or does it even matter?” (ibid., p.89). | “In the economy, profiles make money. In politics, they grant power. In academia, they establish “truth,” or at least credibility. High-profile academics find it easy to publish. They get invited as keynote speakers to major conferences where hundreds or thousands listen to them. Afterward, these hundreds or thousands of lower-profile scholars split up into tiny panels listening to one another’s exegeses of high-profile academics” (ibid., p.109).
Is this how people in this subfield think?
Even if one takes “profilicity” seriously, one cannot help but feel this is a bad look for an already marginalised subfield.
In the context of the entire book, these quotes are attempting to both indicate and understand the dynamics of an interesting object-level phenomenon which arguably has increasing relevance in contemporary life. Anyone can agree that if you shear them of their context and present them in a certain way “the optics are bad”. But what of it?!
It would be more helpful for you and anyone else engaging with your comments to give specific criticisms of Paul and Hans-Georg’s presentation of the dynamics. At present, all you’ve really done is registered your attunement to a certain “vibe”. It comes off as analogous to “even if one takes ‘natural selection’ seriously, one cannot help but feel this ‘red in tooth and claw’ business is a bad look for the field”. Obviously not a valid criticism.
I did mean it as a criticism. I’m curious if the specific claims accurately describe what people take to be going on in the subfield. E.g., the specific claim that scholars don’t read other scholars books. Or that scholars are preoccupied with impact factors.
I found their book interesting, but these specific claims are striking.
I won’t disagree that they don’t read others’ books, are preoccupied with rank and being “high-profile”, care more about appearing decent than being decent, care more about being praised than being praiseworthy, etc. since they tell us that’s how it is, I suspect they’re making a hasty genralization when they suggest that’s how the subfield is. That does indeed paint a bad picture, but largely because it is possibly false outside their sphere.
I take your point about “optics” vs. explanation, and I agree that Moeller and D’Ambrosio are aiming at systemic tendencies rather than individual practices. But I still think there’s a deeper issue here. The examples they use—scholars not reading each other’s books, orienting themselves entirely by metrics, caring more about being praised than being praiseworthy—aren’t just provocative illustrations; they read as empirical claims about how academics actually operate.
The real question, then, isn’t whether profilicity exists, but whether Moeller and D’Ambrosio mistake a feature of some corners of academia for a law of the whole terrain.
didn’t*
JR Williams: Many thanks for reading our book!
You quote us correctly, but you misrepresents the quotes, saying we: “claim that scholars don’t read other scholars books.”
But the quote says: “From time to time, we still read an actual article or book. But often we cannot but read this article or book in the light of the author’s academic profile.”
I encourage you try to reflect a little harder on the meaning of this sentence, and of our theory..
There might be confusion about the English expression “from time to time”, which implies that you seldom do it. And you are interpreting my paraphrase as being universally instantiated, which was not the intended import: the intended import was a lack of due diligence which the quote implies. Whether you are genuinely confused about English idiom or using this as a n attempt witty distraction, I can’t say, but it distracts from what makes your points striking. That is to say, it sidesteps the issue: I’m curious if you mean those quotes to apply generally?
I grant that I’ve possibly misunderstood how generally you meant to apply your specific claims.
The stakes are not trivial. Without more evidence of its widespread applicability, I fear this theory reads less like a systemic critique and more like a description of a specific, localized academic culture. Without evidence, I fear to an unsympathetic reader of these specific claims might even read more like self-confessions than substantial criticism.
You have a chance to defend that your claims aren’t merely describing you and your ilk but the subfield (or academia?) as a whole (as your critics suppose!), but instead you choose to rhetorically reframe substantive concerns as mere comprehension failures. You confirm my suspicion that your claims apply to you, but I have yet to see any reason to believe they generalize. I await the evidence and clarification.
In any case, thank you for the clarification, and my apologies for the imprecise paraphrase. You are right to emphasize that the core of your claim is not that scholars don’t read, but that their reading is now mediated “in the light of the author’s academic profile.” That is a crucial distinction, and I appreciate you correcting the record.
Accepting that more precise formulation, my original question remains, perhaps now with more focus. The striking nature of your claim isn’t just that this phenomenon exists, but its implied universality. My concern is about its scope.
Is this “profile-mediated” engagement you describe:
1. A universal and dominant logic now governing all of academia?
2. A powerful pressure concentrated in elite, high-prestige institutions?
3. A specific cultural dynamic you’ve observed in certain subfields?
My initial worry about the claim reading as a “hasty generalization” or “self-confession” stemmed from this ambiguity. Without a clearer sense of the scope you’re claiming, it’s difficult to assess the theory’s explanatory power. I find the concept compelling, but I’m still trying to understand whether you see it as a description of a specific pathology or as the fundamental operating system for academic credibility today.
Our book, and our theory, is not about Chinese Studies, or Chinese Philosophy, nor even specifically, about the academic system. It’s a book on a theory of identity which is connected to Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, which in turn includes the claim that modern society operates on the basis of all-pervasive second-order observation. Your quotes from our book are to be read in this theoretical context,. In short, we claim, that throughout modern society people increasingly identify in the mode of what we call profilicity, and, since Paul and I are academics, we list some examples of how profilic identity and identification works in this social system that we’re most familiar with. We claim that in order to understand how contemporary society, including the academic system works, you need to recognize the prominent role of second-order observation, and you must be able to practice it well, and profile yourself and others, if you want to have a career.. Or, in your words, “credibility” (including academic credibility) is generated within social systems and tied to profiles. As an academic in contemporary society your credibility is profilic credibility, and not “sincere” or “authentic” credibility. This kind of identity-building (or credibility-building) is not per see pathological, but it can have pathological effects. I hope this helps. Again: thanks for engaging with our work.
I don’t want to rule out the possibility that you’ve discovered a social theory that changes the nature of assessing specific empirical claims. But to anyone who is skeptical that you have such a theory, your argumentative strategy appears like this:
1.) He makes specific, provocative, empirical claims about academia (e.g., scholars don’t read much, they just check profiles).
2.) When you ask for evidence for these specific claims, he pivots. He says you can’t understand the specific claims without first understanding his grand, abstract social theory derived from Niklas Luhmann.
3.) He then re-frames his theory as a neutral, descriptive law of all modern society (“not per se pathological”).
To a very unsympathetic observer, matters are worse. And this is how your worst critics (and some friends!) describe you:
“He [Moeller] “wins” by making the price of challenging him an accusation of being too simple-minded to understand his genius. It’s a tactic designed to exhaust and demoralize opponents, not to find truth.”
I do not think that this description of the academic field is accurate. It is undoubtedly an exaggeration, I think; this said, as is so often the case, every exaggeration contains a grain of truth. Of course, academic debates today are influenced by technological change (it would be naïve to assume otherwise). However, in my experience, there are enough individuals in both the natural sciences and the humanities who are not only concerned with rankings, but with the subject matter itself. It is certainly no coincidence that not all intellectuals are on YouTube, but that many continue to meet in small workshops and conferences to discuss issues very seriously and without giving too much thought to fame and money (the old saying still applies: if you really want to make money, you wouldn’t have started reading philosophical texts, you would have invested in the stock market; and if you really wanted to be famous, you would have gone on television…). Of course, my statement is based only on my own experience; I have not conducted a sociological study. Readers of Daoist texts in particular should not be interested in money and fame, or so I have always thought.
Thanks for you input, Kai! But, fortunately,, some valuable discussions of Chinese philosophy can also be found on YouTube and TV: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8VTLnHdQX8