Analytic Themes in Ancient Chinese Philosophy By Michael Beaney
MONDAY, 21 JUNE 2021 17.30 – 19.15
More information here: https://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/the-proceedings/the-2020-21-programme/michael-beaney/ (including the Zoom link)
(Brought to my attention by an ex-student)
Theme: Moral psychology—insights from Chinese Philosophy
Lead Author: Shun Kwong-loi “Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person”
Curator: Loy Hui-chieh
Invited commentaries from: Michael Slote, Chan Sin-yee, R. Jay Wallace, David Wong
The APR is seeking proposals for open peer commentaries on Shun Kwong-loi “Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person”
Proposal abstracts should be brief (200-500 words), stating clearly the aspects of the lead article that will be discussed, together with an indication of the line that will be taken. More details are available on the APR website, https://www.aap.org.au/APR/
Abstract submissions are due on 30 November 2020. Invitations to write commentaries of 2000-3000 words will be issued on 14 December 2020. Full-length commentaries will be due on 28 February 2021.
2013 is turning out to be a busy time for Chinese and Comparative Philosophy in Singapore. Apart from those of us who are part of the local scene (for instance, Sor Hoon Tan and myself at the National University of Singapore, Alan Chan and Chenyang Li at the Nanyang Technological University), we also have Franklin Perkins visiting NTU (for the academic year 2012/13), and Roger Ames at NUS (for 2013 Spring).
Continue reading →
This is my first post here so I will begin by thanking the Steve and Manyul for first inviting me (and gently reminding me to post), and begging everyone’s indulgence since I wanted to post something less weighty.
So I was reading Ian Johnston’s new complete translation of the Mozi to write a review (out next year in PEW) when I came across this passage in the introduction:
Mo Zi’s argument against Fatalism is very simple. To a significant extent, the simplicity is a result of Mo Zi’s failure to provide, in any of the [“Feiming”] essays, a clear exposition of what Fate actually is or might be. The discussion is really only in terms of what a belief in Fate is presumed to entail. There is no semblance of any argument about determinism and free-will more generally, although the existence of the latter is certainly implied in Mo Zi’s social prescription. (lxv)
It’s a small point in a compact overview of Mohism so I didn’t think it’s necessary to make too much of it (no, what follows is not in my review). But I can’t help but think that Johnston had committed the common error of conflating fatalism with determinism. But that’s not really my point in this post (having just concluded a semester’s teaching on free will and determinism, I think I’ll take a rest from that mess.) Rather, it’s the point that the Mozi text lacks a clear exposition of what Fate is that bugged me. What follows are some relatively unpolished thoughts I had when thinking about Mozi, “Feiming” and Johnston’s complaint. Continue reading →