Here is a link to my paper “Impartiality in the Ancient Root: Two Concepts of Xiàotì.“
(This paper is a correction and improvement of parts of a paper I posted on June 12, 2025.)
Abstract:
Here is a link to my paper “Impartiality in the Ancient Root: Two Concepts of Xiàotì.“
(This paper is a correction and improvement of parts of a paper I posted on June 12, 2025.)
Abstract:
Here is a link to my paper “Blind Spots: On the Authority of Scholarly Consensus on the Analects.”
Abbreviated preface:
In this episode, we continue our exploration of Mohist impartial caring (jian’ai 兼愛) by examining two of Mencius’s most influential objections: (1) the “Without a Father” Argument (Mencius 3B9) and (2) the “Two Roots” Argument (Mencius 3A5).
Along the way, we take up some important questions: Should moral values be impartial even between family members and total strangers? Is radical impartiality incompatible with being human? And should ethics be grounded in (rational) doctrine or in human nature? Continue reading →
At this link is a downloadable long paper defending a speculation on the history of tì 弟/悌.
Edward O. Shaughnessy has convinced me in personal communication that the part of this paper about the Odes is at least inadequately argued—or, as he would say, wrong. I have now posted an improved version of some of the rest of the paper (click here), focusing on xiàotì in the Analects and the Mencius. –BH, 5/25/2026
Oxford University Press has just published my new book on early Confucian social thought, and what contemporary people might learn from it: Mastery, Dependence, and the Ethics of Authority. The publisher’s page is here. At present the cheapest way to purchase it is directly from Oxford, with a discount code for 30% off (AAFLYG6).

This comes with hearty thanks to Steve Angle and Bryan Van Norden, who were belatedly revealed as the press’s referees.

Routledge has published a collection of essays on role ethics edited by Tim Dare and Christine Swanton, which includes two essays on early Confucian ethics. More information is here.
The publisher’s description is as follows:
Although our moral lives would be unrecognisable without them, roles have received little attention from analytic moral philosophers. Roles are central to our lives and to our engagement with one another, and should be analysed in connection with our core notions of ethics such as virtue, reason, and obligation.
This volume aims to redress the neglect of role ethics by confronting the tensions between conceptions of impartial morality and role obligations in the history of analytic philosophy and the Confucian tradition. Different perspectives on the ethical significance of roles can be found by looking to debates within professional and applied ethics, by challenging existing accounts of how roles generate reasons, by questioning the hegemony of ethical reasons, and by exploring the relation between expertise and virtue. The essays tackle several core questions related to these debates:
What are roles and what is their normative import?
To what extent are roles and the ethics of roles central to ethics as opposed to virtue in general, and obligation in general?
Are role obligations characteristically incompatible with ordinary morality in professions such as business, law, and medicine?
How does practical reason function in relation to roles?
Perspectives in Role Ethics is an examination of a largely neglected topic in ethics. It will appeal to a broad range of scholars in normative ethics, virtue ethics, non-Western ethics, and applied ethics interested in the importance of roles in our moral life.
While scouring the web for freebies this morning, I came across something that may be of interest to many readers here: The Global Encyclopedia of Informality, University College London, 2018, in two volumes.
http://oapen.org/search?identifier=642570;keyword=informality
Here’s the table of contents for Volume 1:
My guess, really just a guess, is that the discussion of role ethics or relational ethics might benefit from some direct attention to a couple of fallacies available for commission—one minor, one major. I don’t know whether they’re actually committed or directly discussed in the literature. Possible examples of each can be found in Henry Rosemont’s essay “Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons” (in Mary Bockover, ed., Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, Open Court 1991, pp. 71-101). I’ll make that my text. I don’t understand it.
This post expands a question I asked once in the old Discussions section.
It is sometimes said that the (or a) Ruist picture of moral psychology stresses family because Ruists stress the development of moral sensibilities starting with people’s earliest relationships, which are their childhood relationships at home. So … what about household servants?
SUNY has published Maria Franca Sibau, Reading for the Moral: Exemplarity and the Confucian Moral Imagination in Seventeenth-Century Chinese Short Fiction. A new perspective that should shed light on discussions of roles, roles ethics, virtue ethics, and exemplarity! More info is here or below.