Across different religious and moral traditions we often find some version of the Golden Rule. In this episode we explore the Golden Rule as formulated in the Analects and explore questions such as how fundamental it is to the Confucian ethical framework, how it is supposed to work in actual practice, and how it connects with issues about self-centeredness. We also examine how it might apply differently to ordinary people and sages, focusing on Analects 15.24 and Analects 6.30.
Key passages
The Classic Formulation of the Golden Rule (Analects 15.24)
子貢問曰：「有一言而可以終身行之者乎？」子曰：「其恕乎！己所不欲，勿施於人。」
Zigong asked, “Is there one teaching that can serve as a guide for one’s entire life?”
The Master answered, “Is it not ‘sympathetic understanding’ (shù 恕). Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire.”
(Analects 15.24, Edward Slingerland’s translation)
The Golden Rule for Sages Passage (Analects 6.30)
子貢曰：「如有博施於民而能濟眾，何如？可謂仁乎？」子曰：「何事於仁，必也聖乎！堯舜其猶病諸！夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。能近取譬，可謂仁之方也已。」
Zigong said, “If there were one able to bestow much upon the common people and bring succor to the multitudes, what would you make of him? Could such a person be called humane (ren 仁)?”
The Master, said, “Why stop at humane? Such a person should surely be called a sage! Even someone like Yao or Shun would find such a task daunting. Desiring to take his stand, one who is humane helps others to take their stand; wanting to realize himself, he helps others to realize themselves. Being able to take what is near at hand as an analogy could perhaps be called the method of humaneness.”
(Analects 6.30, Edward Slingerland’s translation, slightly modified)
Some terms and references mentioned in the episode
Zina Hitz, Lost in Thought
anquan gan 安全感 (sense of security)
Charles Mingus (jazz musician)
Dai Zhen 戴震 (later Confucian philosopher, for whom empathy is a central value and notion)
The Hong Kong Ethics Lab (our sponsor)
Analects 4.15 (The “Single Thread” Passage)
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (on compassion, empathy, and the example of the sadist’s “empathy”)
David Nivison, “Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Ways of Confucianism
Bryan Van Norden, “Unweaving the ‘One Thread’ of Analects 4:15”
tui 推 (making inferences based on analogical similarity, pushing)
Lao Siguang 勞思光，新編中國哲學史 vol. 3 (gives the “eating spicy foods” example in applying the Golden Rule)
Zhu Xi 朱熹, Sishu huowen 四書或問
Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy
David Foster Wallace, “This is Water”
Einfühlung (German word that is sometimes said to be the first to refer to modern “empathy”)
Analects 5.12 (the “don’t want” 無欲 variation of the Golden Rule)
Second-tone wu: 無
Fourth-tone wu (“imperative wu”): 勿
yan 言 (teachings, words)
Mengzi 7A4
The Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤)
Ezra Stotland, “Exploratory Investigations in Empathy” (coined the phrases “imagine-self empathy” and “imagine-other empathy”)
Two of Justin’s articles on Neo-Confucian distinctions between types of empathy:
• “Zhu Xi on Self-Focused vs. Other-Focused Empathy”
• “Sympathy and Perspective-Taking in Confucian Ethics”
Yang Shi 楊時 (the Neo-Confucian who over-emphasizes mystical oneness)
Justin Tiwald, “Dai Zhen on Sympathetic Concern“
Thanks for one more fine episode. I liked the attention for the Neo Confucian thinking about the subject and the information about the philological and close reading approach as practiced by Zhu Xi.
I think something is to be said in favor of the ‘silver’ above the ‘golden’ rule because we are evolutionary wired to be much more focused upon negative experiences than positive ones so following the silver rule might be more beneficial.
The distinction between a morally ‘lesser’ and ‘higher’ way of practicing 恕 is interesting. The practice of 近取譬is also reflected in Yan Zun’s 嚴遵 (first century BCE) commentary to Laozi 55, starting with: 是故我身者，彼身之尺寸也: ‘being myself a body, (I understand) the measure of other (people’s) bodies.’ (I’m tempted to translate 尺寸 as ‘I can empathize with the bandwidth of what it is to be embodied’).
A difficulty with the golden rule, of course, is that we often don’t know what somebody else wants, because we too easily extrapolate our own wants and desires. Zhuangzi 18.10 talks about a seabird that is entertained by the Marquis of Lu but dies after three days because ‘the marquis was trying to use what was nourishing to himself to nourish the bird, instead of using what was nourishing to the bird’ (tr. Ziporyn) 此以己養養鳥也，非以鳥養養鳥也。
Zhuangzi widens the circle of 恕 beyond the human realm. Here and elsewhere (chapter 9, first paragraph on horses and 17.1 on oxen and horses he seems a forerunner of the so-called capabilities approach as developed by Sen and elaborated by Nussbaum regarding animal rights (see here). Daoism is morally more ‘inclusive’ than Confucianism. Kongzi’s reaction when he heard that the stables had been burnt down 「傷人乎？」不問馬。( ‘Has anyone been wounded?’; he did not ask about the horses; Lunyu 10.12) exemplifies his humanistic stance – which was a great step forward at the time.
But to be fair, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (11 century) surpasses even Zhuangzi in his refusal to cut the grass growing outside his window, saying, ‘The feeling of the grass and mine are the same.’ (reciting from notes; I couldn’t find the original text quickly).
I think that widening the circle of 恕 will be our big challenge for the future.
“Zhuangzi widens the circle of 恕 beyond the human realm.”
Are you confusing 恕 with 怒*? The latter is an important concept in the Zhuangzi. As far as I am aware, 恕 does not occur in the Zhuangzi. Or do you mean that the idea of 恕 occurs in the Zhuangzi, just not the expression?
In that case, there are certain illiberal aspects of the Zhungzi as well. This line that Lao Dan says to Confucius in Chapter 21 always comes to mind: “cast off slaves as though you were casting off mud and dirt.” (棄隸者若棄泥塗). One, including many translators, is inclined to interpret 隸 as meaning something other than what the text literally says…
(*NB: Zhuangzi reads “怒而飛” 之怒 as 努, not as “喜怒”之怒; “努” was written “怒” at the time.)
P.S. Now that I check, Watson gets the gist of the shockingly illiberal Chapter 21 passage correct: “A man will discard the servants who wait upon him as though they were so much earth or mud, for he knows that his own person is of more worth than the servants who tend it….”(棄隸者若棄泥塗，知身貴於隸也…) Compare Legge’s fancy footwork: “Those who renounce the paraphernalia of rank do it as if they were casting away so much mud–they know that they are themselves more honourable than those paraphernalia….”
@ j.Williams,
I meant to say that, in comparison to the Confucian (humanistic) understanding and practice of the (Confucian) concept of 恕, the philosophy of Zhuangzi casts the net of concern wider, beyond the human real mto that of animals. I didn’t mean to say that he explicitly discussed the concept of 恕 in this way.
Does 隸 (which Kroll also glosses as servitor, subaltern or runner), not refer to the ‘four limbs and hundred members of the body to be considered as mere dust and dirt’ 四支百體將為塵垢, just before the line you quote?
Ah, I see what you mean.
As for the Chapter 21 line: 老庄词典, p. 348 glosses the specific usage of 隸 as “隶属 [隸屬]; 附属 [附屬]”.
The traditional authorities Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 and Lin Xiyi 林希逸 speak of 僕隸 “servants or slaves”. Lin Xiyi spells out the underlying thought: 僕隸去來, 棄如泥塗, 以我貴而彼賤也 (“Servants or slaves come and go, cast off like mud, because I take myself as honourable and others as lowly.”) The metaphor is to take the inscrutable contingency of one’s fortunes in this world with the same insouciance as one takes losing a subordinate (or servant or slave): 得喪禍福無非自然，又何足以為吾心之患 (“gain and loss, fortune and misfortune are all natural occurrences, so how could they trouble my heart?”). The “changes in external things” (外物之變, continuing with Lin’s phraseology,) become as indifferent as the loss of a subordinate (or servant or slave).
Carlo and John: really enjoyed this discussion, which describes well a certain Zhuangist critique of Confucian moralism and moral psychology. And interesting passage in Chapter 21! My impression from my more sporadic reading of commentaries is that yi 役 is the character used more often to suggest a kind of subservience to contingent (external) goods. Not entirely sure what to make of li 隸 in this context, but John’s interpretation (following Lin Xiyi) seems plausible.
Many thanks to all of the friends and colleagues who wrote us about this episode (here, by email, and on social media). It’s truly gratifying, particularly for me this time (insofar as I finally got to share more widely the work on later Confucian distinctions between variants of empathy).
I’m told that I have been positioning the microphone a bit too close to me as we record, so that the sibilant consonants sound somewhat distorted. We have four more pre-recorded episodes that have yet to be released, but in the episodes that follow those four, hopefully, the recording of my voice will sound a bit more crisp.
Really enjoying “hearing” (more precisely, reading) your thoughts about these episodes!