I think it might interest you that the Taiwanese Research Council has just sent a research team to Germany (including Lee Ming-huei, Fabian Heubel, me, and a couple of other Taiwanese scholars) that will be involved in a series of workshops and discussions with German sinology and philosophy departments during this week and next week (see the schedule below). I think this is a rare opportunity to foster the intercultural dialogue between the fields of Chinese philosophy and German philosophy (notice that there will be one event at the very prestigious Institut fuer Sozialforschung in Frankfurt). If you are interested in any of these events, please contact me and I will send you more details. Of course you are all welcome to join us if you happen to be in one of these places in the coming days!
Category Archives: Chinese philosophy – 中國哲學 – 中国哲学
Which Resources Do You Recommend for Interpreting Classical Chinese Terminology?
This is a follow-up to Manyul’s recent post about the TLS.
I’m wondering whether professors of Chinese philosophy at English-speaking universities encourage their students to begin to access terms in the original Chinese. Perhaps it would be as simple as referring them to the glossary in the back of Ivanhoe and Van Norden’s Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy and then prompting them to be aware of those key terms in their reading, or it could be as complex as asking them to research a particular term across various texts.
There are a couple of reasons for asking. The first is that I have a belief that beginning to entertain the notion that there is more to a Chinese term’s semantic field than is represented in any particular translation yields a more profitable understanding for the student, and (assuming others hold the same belief) I’m curious about how others go about encouraging that. The second is that the potential of computing power to help in this regard is now quite high, and so I am wondering how electronic resources may be playing a role. The perspective I’m looking for is that of the professor who is teaching the student who is not competent in Chinese.
There are also other perspectives that will be different but just as illuminating for me: Continue reading →
Comedians as Daoist Missionaries
From friend of the blog, Mark Saltveit who, among other things, is a professional stand-up comedian, we have a special guest post. Mark writes:
I’ve written about my profession of standup comedy as applied Daoism. I’ve just turned in a draft of this for editing to MefiMag, the print expression of the Metafilter website, who commissioned it. I would love to get feedback and corrections from your readers for my final version. (MefiMag doesn’t mind if this appears on the web before they print it.)
Mark will be replying to your comments himself. Enjoy.
Comedians as Taoist Missionaries
By Mark Saltveit
I’ve worked as a paid standup comedian on the West Coast for 12 years. It’s fascinating, rewarding, and usually compelling – but it’s still work. Comedians joke around a lot and are usually fun people, but the job itself is not especially amusing. I’ve heard that stripping and prostitution aren’t that sexy, either.
What does it mean to know li (zhili 知禮) in the Lunyu—knowing how?
The four passages on 知禮 in the Lunyu: 3.15, 3.22, 7.31, 20.3 shed some light on 知—is it knowing how, knowing that, or some combination of them, or perhaps a different kind of knowing?
In 7.31, Confucius himself is challenged. Perhaps here we see an ordering (prioritisation) of li? Confucius is challenged again in 3.15. This is a really interesting case: the person who has observed Confucius asking questions at the Hall presumes that Confucius does so because he lacks knowledge. On this basis, he asks if Confucius actually knows li. Confucius’ response turns the tables on the inquirer. To ask questions (i.e. what he was doing then) is not a sign of not knowing that; it is in fact a manifestation of knowing-how to perform li (it is an act of respect or courtesy by a visitor to the Hall to show interest in its details).
In 3.22, Confucius judges that Guanzhong does not know li — on the basis that he has failed to manifest the appropriate li in court. Hence, Confucius asks the rhetorical question concerning whether Guanzhong did really know li.
So here we’ve got some evidence that knowing how is necessary for zhili in these two conversations. *Perhaps even necessary and sufficient in 3.22? (I’m just not sure about this point, though—and I’d like to hear what others think.).
Postdoctoral Research Fellowships in Sydney, Australia (2012 – )
UNSW invites applications for a limited number of Vice-Chancellor’s Postdoctoral Research Fellowships in 2012, to be awarded to early career researchers of exceptional calibre wishing to conduct full-time research at UNSW in any of its areas of research strengths.
* Applicants must have been awarded a PhD confer dated (on testamur); no earlier than 1 January 2007 or later than 31st December 2010.
* Fellows will be appointed at Academic Salary Level A (A$71K – $76K) or Level B (A$80K- $85K) per year (plus 17% employer superannuation and leave loading) based on years of experience. A Research Support Grant of A$10,000 per annum for three years will be provided on commencement. The University’s employment conditions apply to the Fellowships, including such entitlements as relocation allowance on appointment.
* Fellowships will be offered for a period of 2 years, renewable for a third year subject to research performance in the top 25% of their level of appointment and evidence of actively seeking externally funded fellowships.
Please contact Karyn Lai (k.lai@unsw.edu.au) for research in Chinese Philosophy.
More details are available at: https://research.unsw.edu.au/2012_VCFellowships
What Does It Mean to "Respond to Enmity with Excellence"?
I’ve been recently thinking about an issue that comes up in both the Daodejing and the Analects. DDJ 63, specifically, is commented on in Analects 14.34. In the two texts, we see different positions concerning how one should respond to enmity 怨 yuan. DDJ 63 reads:
為無為，事無事，味無味。大小多少，報怨以德。圖難於其易，為大於其細；天下難事，必作於易，天下大事，必作於細。是以聖人終不為大，故能成其大… Continue reading →
Neo-Confucian Moral Perception
Steve mentioned Kai Marchal’s and Huang Yong’s papers on moral perception and motivation is his report from the Soochow University conference. I’ve been thinking about some of the issues raised in them, and since both of them (and Steve, who raises some of these issues in his book) contribute to the blog, this seems like the perfect chance to try to get clearer. I’m no expert on either Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming, so I’ll let others weigh in on the interpretive issues. I’m more interested in the general moral psychology/epistemology. Continue reading →
I am virtuous, and I hate you.
Actually, both parts of that conjunction are false: I am far from virtuous, and I probably don’t hate you. (Really I don’t.) But say I were virtuous: what would be the problem with me hating some people? Would feeling hatred toward some individuals detract from my overall moral standing? And forget about poor old un-virtuous me. What about someone who, by all accounts, really was virtuous–Confucius. Would it detract from his moral standing if he hated some people?
Xunzi on Poverty
Book 9 of the Xunzi includes a passage that seems to argue that in order to prevent desperate poverty (qiong 窮) it is necessary that some people be poor (pin 貧) while others are rich. Sorting out the view Xunzi takes of poverty in this argument is harder than you might expect.
The argument’s central claim is that if people are equal in their power and position and the same in their desires and aversions, this will inevitably lead to conflict, disorder, and poverty. The sages are supposed to have solved this problem by establishing the rituals and the duties, a hierarchical system that ensures that some can lead while others follow.
Why, though, must there be inequality of wealth as well as of power? Continue reading →
Rodney Taylor on Confucianism on Huffington Post
Our thanks to fellow blogger, Chris Panza, for the heads up.
Rodney Taylor enlightens the Huff Post readership on what Confucianism really is HERE.
Just to get you interested, here’s something Taylor says in the piece:
By emphasizing the learning of the sages of antiquity, Confucius believed rulers ruled by the Mandate of Heaven. Confucius thus supported the theocratic nature of the Chinese state. More importantly, however, he supported the religious authority associated with T’ien as a principle of “purpose.” Because of T’ien, the universe had a purpose and that purpose was exercised on behalf of the state. For the Confucians, this “purpose” of Heaven was seen as a greater authority than the power of rulership itself. The ruler only ruled because of Heaven’s Mandate, and the Mandate could be taken away. To hold the Mandate, the criterion was the moral conduct of the ruler. In Confucian thought, much is made of the distinction between a ruler, wang, a true ruler of moral worth, and a tyrant, pa, one who exercises power only for his own personal aggrandizement.
