Warp, Weft, and Way

Chinese and Comparative Philosophy 中國哲學與比較哲學

TOC: Comparative Philosophy 2:1

Contents of Volume 2 No 2 (2011) of the journal Comparative Philosophy (Titles only; see below for Abstracts)

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Christopher Framarin (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada):
Ātman, Identity, and Emanation: Arguments for a Hindu Environmental Ethic”, Comparative Philosophy 2:1 (2011): 3-24.


Tommy L. Lott
(Professor, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, USA):
Comparative Aspects of Africana Philosophy and the Continental-Analytic Divide”, Comparative Philosophy 2:1 (2011): 25-37.

Alexus McLeod (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Dayton, USA):
Pluralism about Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong’s Approach”, Comparative Philosophy 2:1 (2011): 38-60.

Contents of Volume 2 No 2 (2011) of the journal Comparative Philosophy (With ABSTRACTS)

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Christopher Framarin (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada):
Ātman, Identity, and Emanation: Arguments for a Hindu Environmental Ethic”, Comparative Philosophy 2:1 (2011): 3-24.

Abstract:
Many contemporary authors argue that since certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman (God), these texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. I outline three common versions of this argument, and argue that each fails to meet at least one criterion for an environmental ethic. This doesn’t mean, however, that certain Hindu texts and traditions do not provide the basis for an environmental ethic. In the last section of the paper I briefly outline and defend an alternative, according to which all plants and animals have intrinsic value and direct moral standing in virtue of having a good.

Tommy L. Lott
(Professor, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, USA):
Comparative Aspects of Africana Philosophy and the Continental-Analytic Divide”, Comparative Philosophy 2:1 (2011): 25-37.

Abstract:
Critical engagement involving philosophers trained in continental and analytic traditions often takes its purpose to be a reconciliation of tensions arising from differences in style, or method. Critical engagement in Africana philosophy, however, is rarely focused on method, style, or orientation because philosophic research in this field, regardless of orientation, has had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines outside of philosophy. I focus primarily on the comparative dimensions of three important strands of this research: (1) a history of ideas, (2) a problem-orientation, and (3) a sub-area specialization, to indicate why a need to reconcile tensions between continental and analytic orientations has very little currency in Africana philosophy. Socio-economic problems faced by African-descended people require multiple perspectives to accommodate the wide variety of diasporic social contexts for a given proposal. With an eye to this pragmatic concern, I aim to show that Africana philosophy benefits from an interplay of many intersecting factors and that, as an interdisciplinary area of research with a commitment to the incorporation of multiple perspectives, it fosters cross-pollination and hybridization of continental and analytic traditions.

Alexus McLeod (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Dayton, USA):
Pluralism about Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong’s Approach”, Comparative Philosophy 2:1 (2011): 38-60.

Abstract:
The debate concerning truth in Classical Chinese philosophy has for the most part avoided the possibility that pluralist theories of truth were part of the classical philosophical framework. I argue that the Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong (c. 25-100 CE) can be profitably read as endorsing a kind of pluralism about truth grounded in the concept of shi
, or “actuality”. In my exploration of this view, I explain how it offers a different account of the truth of moral and non-moral statements, while still retaining the univocality of the concept of truth (that is, that the concept amounts to more than the expression of a disjunction of various truth properties), by connecting shi with normative and descriptive facts about how humans appraise statements.  In addition to providing insight into pluralist views of truth in early China, the unique pluralist view implicit in Wang’s work can help solve problems with contemporary pluralist theories of truth.


January 27th, 2011 Posted by | Comparative philosophy, Tables of Contents | no comments

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