What is the nature and source of morality? Are human beings naturally inclined toward moral goodness? The early Confucian thinker Mencius (Mengzi) believed that human beings by nature possessed certain moral sprouts that could be nurtured and developed into robust virtues. In this episode we explore Mencius’s account of these moral sprouts, examining both philosophical and psychological justifications for their existence.

Featured passage

Mencius 2A6, The Child at the Well:

[1] 孟子曰：「人皆有不忍人之心。先王有不忍人之心，斯有不忍人之政矣。以不忍人之心，行不忍人之政，治天下可運之掌上。

[1] Mencius said, “All humans have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others. The Former Kings had hearts that were not unfeeling toward others, so they had governments that were not unfeeling toward others. If one puts into practice a government that is not unfeeling toward others by means of a heart that is not unfeeling toward others, bringing order to the whole world is in the palm of your hand. 

[2] 所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者，今人乍見孺子將入於井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心。非所以內交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。由是觀之，無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。

[2] “The reason why I say that all humans have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others is this. Suppose someone suddenly a child about to fall into a well: anyone in such a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion—not because one sought to get in good with the child’s parents, not because one wanted fame among one’s neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child’s cries.

[3] 惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。

[3] “From this we can see that if one is without the feeling of compassion [ceyin 惻隱], one is not human. If one is without the feeling of disdain [xiuwu 羞惡], one is not human. If one is without the feeling of deference [cirang 辭讓], one is not human. If one is without the feeling of approval and disapproval [shifei 是非], one is not human. The feeling of compassion is the sprout [duan 端] of benevolence. The feeling of disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The feeling of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety. The feeling of approval and disapproval is the sprout of wisdom.

人之有是四端也，猶其有四體也。有是四端而自謂不能者，自賊者也；謂其君不能者，賊其君者也。凡有四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始然，泉之始達。苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充之，不足以事父母。」

“People having these four sprouts is like their having four limbs. To have these four sprouts, yet to claim that that one is incapable (of virtue), is to steal from oneself. To say that one’s ruler is incapable is to steal from one’s ruler. In general, having these four sprouts within oneself, if one knows to fill them all out, it will be like a fire starting up, a spring breaking through! If one can merely fill them out, they will be sufficient to care for all within the Four Seas. If one merely fails to fill them out, they will be insufficient to serve one’s parents.”

(Mengzi 2A6, slightly modified from Bryan Van Norden’s translation)

Some terms and references mentioned in the episode

• Hallgeir Sjåstad and Roy F. Baumeister, “The Future and the Will: Planning requires self-control, and ego depletion leads to planning aversion” (influential article on “decision fatigue”)
• Zisi 子思 (perhaps Mencius’s teacher)
• Inglorious Basterds (film)
• Philippa Foot (the more recent philosopher that we keep mentioning)
• Eirik Lang Harris, “The Nature of the Virtues in Light of the Early Confucian Tradition” (response to Foot on behalf of Confucian virtue theory)
• Lei 類 (type, kind, natural kind)
• Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension” (chapter 8 of this book)
• Franklin Perkins, Doing What You Really Want
• Yong HUANG, Why Be Moral?
• Mencius 6A6
• Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (source of the phrases “system 1” and “system 2” to refer to different kinds of thinking)
• Richard Kim, Confucianism and the Philosophy of Well-Being
• xin 心 (heart, heart-mind, state-of-heartmind, feelings)
• qing 情 (later became a standard character for “feelings”)
• Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought
• Shifei zhi xin 是非之心 (the “feeling” or state-of-heart-mind of approval and disapproval)
• Owen Flanagan, The Geography of Morals (see chapters 3-5 on the moral sprouts and moral modules)
• Jonathan Haidt, Moral Foundations Theory