This episode examines the Mohist doctrine of impartial caring (jian’ai 兼愛) via two arguments in the Mozi — the Caretaker Argument and the Filial Piety Argument. We examine the arguments’ logical structure, the psychological plausibility, and practical applicability. We also discuss the importance of reciprocity and competing interpretations of “impartial caring,” from the less demanding don’t-harm-anyone interpretation to stronger equal-concern readings, setting them against the Confucian model of care-with-distinctions (graded love). We also consider what genuine filiality requires and how different moral frameworks shape familial and social practices.
Key passages
The Caretaker Argument
然即敢問，今有平原廣野於此，被甲嬰冑將往戰，死生之權未可識也；又有君大夫之遠使於巴、越、齊、荊，往來及否未可識也，然即敢問，不識將惡也家室，奉承親戚，提挈妻子，而寄託之？不識於兼之有是乎？於別之有是乎？我以為當其於此也，天下無愚夫愚婦，雖非兼之人，必寄託之於兼之有是也。此言而非兼，擇即取兼，即此言行費也。不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也。
Suppose one must put on one’s armor and helmet and go to war in a vast and open wilderness where life and death are uncertain; or suppose one was sent by one’s ruler or high minister to the distant states of Ba, Yue, Qi, or Jing and could not be sure of either reaching them or ever returning from one’s mission. Under such conditions of uncertainty, to whom would one entrust the well-being of one’s parents, wife, and children? Would one prefer that they be in the care of an impartial person or would one prefer that they be in the care of a partial person? I believe that under such circumstances, there are no fools in all the world. Even though one may not advocate impartiality, one would certainly want to entrust one’s family to the person who is impartial. But this is to condemn impartiality in word but prefer it in deed, with the result that one’s actions do not accord with what one says. And so, I don’t see what reason any person in the world who has heard about impartiality can give for condemning it.
Mozi, chapter 16 (“Impartial Caring”), Philip J. Ivanhoe’s translation
The Filial Piety Argument
然而天下之非兼者之言，猶未止，曰：「意不忠親之利，而害為孝乎？」子墨子曰：「姑嘗本原之孝子之為親度者。吾不識孝子之為親度者，亦欲人愛利其親與？意欲人之惡賊其親與？以說觀之，即欲人之愛利其親也。然即吾惡先從事即得此？若我先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我愛利吾親乎？意我先從事乎惡人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親乎？即必吾先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親也。然即之交孝子者，果不得已乎，毋先從事愛利人之親者與？意以天下之孝子為遇而不足以為正乎？
Though this is so, there are still people in the world who condemn impartiality, saying, “It does not seek what is beneficial for one’s parents, so does it not harm filial piety?”
Our teacher Mozi says, “Let us consider the case of a filial son who seeks what is beneficial for his parents. Does a filial son who seeks what is beneficial for his parents want other people to care for and benefit his parents or does he want other people to dislike and steal from his parents? According to the very meaning of filial piety, he must want other people to care for and benefit his parents. Given this, how should one act in order to bring about such a state of affairs? Should one first care for and benefit the parents of another, expecting that they in turn will respond by caring for and benefitting one’s own parents? Or should one first dislike and steal from other people’s parents, expecting that they in turn will respond by caring for and benefitting one’s own parents? Clearly one must first care for and benefit the parents of others in order to expect that they in turn will respond by caring for and benefitting one’s own parents. And so for such mutually filial sons to realize unlimited good results, must they not first care for and benefit other people’s parents? Or should they let it be the case that filial sons are the exception and not the rule among the people of the world?
Mozi, chapter 16 (“Impartial Caring”), Philip J. Ivanhoe’s translation
Sources and phrases mentioned
- Mohism (the philosophy associated with Mozi 墨子)
- Bryan Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy
- Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (see p. 113 for his “social dao” view, and see Van Norden [above] for a response, pp. 183 and 377-80)
- Chris Fraser, The Philosophy of the Mòzǐ
- jian’ai 兼愛 (impartial care, impartial caring, inclusive concern)
- bie 別 (partial, partiality)
- Loy, Hui-chieh, “On the Argument for Jian’ai” (this is the article that discusses the “main argument” for impartial caring)
- graded love (Confucian view about proper care, also called “care with distinctions,” sometimes translates ai you chadeng 愛有差等)
- false dichotomy
- you 友 (friend)
- yong 用 (used, applied)
- filial piety (xiao 孝)
- The Mohist Canons on “non-instrumental” care (ai 愛)
- li 利 (benefit, well-being)
- Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) 3B9 (the “without a father” objection to impartial caring)
- Alexus McLeod, “Some Considerations in Defense of a Radical Reading of the Mohist ‘Jian Ai‘“
- Bryan Van Norden, “Review of The Philosophy of the Mòzǐ, by Chris Fraser“
- Carine Defoort, “Are the Three ‘Jian Ai‘ Chapters about Universal Love?“
- Youngsun Back, “Reconstructing Mozi’s Jian’ai 兼愛” and “Rethinking Mozi’s Jian’ai“
- consequentialism
