Rico Vitz

Abstract:

“In this paper, I analyze the relationship between Hume’s moral philosophy and a key aspect of classical Confucianism—namely, the concept of lĭ (禮), which refers both to the virtue of ritual propriety and to rituals themselves. I argue not only that Hume employs conceptual correlates to each of these two aspects of lĭ (禮), but also that he employs them in ways that have a similar, distinctively normative role in the process of moral formation. I illustrate these points by elucidating Hume’s use of two pairs of concepts. The first is his presentation of decency and decorum. The second is his explanation of customs and manners. In so doing, I develop a line of inquiry that is important, novel, and promising both for Hume scholarship per se and for comparative philosophical work on the relationship between Hume’s moral philosophy and that of classical Confucianism, especially as it is expressed in the works of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.”

Dobin Choi

Abstract:

“I examine Hume’s and Mengzi’s reliance on aesthetic and moral taste in their sentiment-based theories of virtue. Their views on taste seem to conflict. In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume observes that people’s taste sentiments appear to vary, but he seeks a standard that can reconcile them. In contrast, relying on the uniformity of aesthetic taste, Mengzi argues that humans, by nature, share a universal taste toward morality. I argue that the apparent contrast in the two philosophers’ views originates from their attending to different aspects of taste and sentiments for their different theoretical goals. For an empirical account of aesthetic evaluation, Hume observes the ordinary phenomena of taste, people’s varied particular sentiments; he then investigates their initial causes in the mind to establish a reliable standard. Mengzi takes cases of uniform taste to imply the same mental cause of moral taste, which is the cornerstone of people’s moral self-cultivation. Relying on the sentiments for moral distinction and cultivation, both Hume and Mengzi reach similar conclusions: they recognize a practical standard, rather than empirical rules, in those who have achieved excellence in their aesthetic and moral taste, and suggest that the ultimate standard of taste is the natural constitution of the human mind.”

Yumiko Inukai

Abstract:

“Comparisons have been drawn between certain aspects of Hume’s philosophy and Buddhist philosophy, particularly concerning their views on the self. While it is intriguing to discover affinities between two philosophical systems that are separated far apart by both time and space, comparison would become superficial if similarities are found merely in their general, overall claims or doctrines. Although engaging in a comparative exploration between Hume and Buddhist philosophers on the self can reveal remarkable similarities in their accounts, it can also provide valuable insights into their differences. The differences between Hume’s and Buddhist philosophers’ views become evident when considering the debates about the self among Buddhist philosophers, which have resulted in diverse accounts within the Buddhist tradition. Indeed, it is those differences that prove to be more illuminating for recognizing and understanding subtle aspects and various components of Hume’s account, which may not be adequately described or distinguished by Hume himself. These aspects are particularly revealed in Hume’s brief description of dissatisfaction with his own account in the Appendix. The primary objective of this paper is to uncover the system of reality underlying Hume’s account of the self, which creates a labyrinth for him, by drawing upon Buddhist ideas and debates regarding the self.”