For a state to be well governed, it seems like it needs both good institutional rules and also good people to run things. But is one of these factors more fundamental or important than the other? Confucian political thought is widely associated with the view that what’s most critical for good governance is to have people of good character in charge — people who possess sound judgment and genuinely care about those they govern. This longstanding feature of Confucian politics is traceable to a highly influential essay attributed to the Confucian philosopher Xunzi (3rd century BCE), who argued that “people” and not “institutional rules” are the proper sources of good order. In this episode, we explore Xunzi’s defence of virtue in politics, his multiple disagreements with the more institutionalist political thinkers known as Legalists, and the significance of his views for later times.

Key passages

First passage: “People, not institutions”

有亂君，無亂國；有治人，無治法，羿之法非亡也，而羿不世中；禹之法猶存，而夏不世王。故法不能獨立，類不能自行；得其人則存，失其人則亡。法者、治之端也；君子者、法之原也。故有君子，則法雖省，足以遍矣；無君子，則法雖具，失先後之施，不能應事之變，足以亂矣。不知法之義，而正法之數者，雖博臨事必亂。故明主急得其人，而闇主急得其勢。

There are lords that create chaos; there are no states that create chaos. There are people who create order; there are no rules [fa 法] that create order. The rules of Archer Yi have not perished, but not every age has an Archer Yi who hits the target precisely. The rules of Yu still survive, but not every age has a Xia dynasty to reign as true kings. Thus, rules cannot stand alone, and categories cannot implement themselves. If one has the right person, then they will be preserved. If one loses the right person, then they will be lost. The rules are the beginning of order, and the gentleman is the origin of the rules. And so, with the gentleman present, even if the rules are sketchy, they are enough to be comprehensive. Without the gentleman, even if the rules are complete, one will fail to apply them in the right order and will be unable to respond to changes in affairs, and thus they can serve to create chaos. One who tries to correct the arrangements of the rules without understanding their meaning, even if he is broadly learned, is sure to create chaos when engaged in affairs. And so, the enlightened ruler hastens to obtain the right person. The deluded ruler hastens to obtain power.

(Xunzi, chapter 12; slightly modified from Eric Hutton’s translation)

     Second passage: “The right person”

彼其人者，生乎今之世，而志乎古之道。以天下之王公莫好之也，然而是子獨好之；以天下之民莫為¹之也，然而是子獨為之。好之者貧，為之者窮，然而是子猶將為之也，不為少頃輟焉。曉然獨明於先王之所以得之，所以失之，知國之安危臧否，若別白黑。是其人也。

That “right person” is such that he lives in the world of today, but his intentions are set on the ways of ancient times. If no kings and dukes in the world are fond of those ways, then nevertheless he will be fond of them by himself. If no other people in the world desire those ways, then nevertheless he will practice them by himself. If anyone who is fond of those ways suffers poverty, and anyone who practices them will suffer dire straits, then nevertheless he will still practice them by himself, without stopping for even a moment. He alone understands clearly why past kings succeeded or failed, and he knows what will make a state safe or endangered or good or bad, as plainly as differentiating white from black. Such is “the right person.”

(Xunzi, chapter 12; from Eric Hutton’s translation)

Sources and phrases mentioned

• Navier–Stokes problems
• yulu 語錄 (“recorded sayings”) or jiangxue yulu 講學語錄 (roughly, “pedagogical recorded sayings”)
• Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200 CE), the The Cheng brothers (11th century CE),  Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529)
• Mencius (Mengzi 孟子, 4th century BCE)
• The Legalists (or “the Fajia 法家 thinkers”)
• quan 權 (weighing, discretion, the capacity to judge whether a particular rule applies or can be bent in special cases)
• value-alignment problems
• Xunzi 荀子 (“Master Xun,” 3^rd century BCE)
• virtue politics
• Some notable Legalist philosophers: Shang Yang 商鞅 (“Lord Shang” 商君, c. 390-338 BCE), Shen Dao 慎到 (c. late 4th or early 3rd century BCE), Shen Buhai 申不害 (c.400-c.337BCE), Han Feizi 韩非子 (c. 280-c.233 BCE)
• Lord Acton (John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, 1834-1902; wrote the memorable slogan “absolute power corrupts absolutely”)
• fa 法 (rules, institutional rules, laws)
• Justin Tiwald, “On the View that People and Not Institutions Bear Primary Credit for Success in Governance” (Justin’s paper on today’s topic, and on Confucian virtue politics in later in Chinese history)
• Mary Midgley, Beast and Man
• Jennifer Wang, a philosopher at Simon Fraser University
• Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-1695; a famous institutionalist Confucian, author of Waiting for the Dawn or Mingyi daifanglu 明夷待訪錄)
• the argument from underdetermination
• G.K. Chesterton, the writer came up with a memorable metaphor to “walls around a playground” to illustrate the rationale for absolute prohibitions
• shi 勢, power, “positional power”
• robust character traits
• situationist social psychologists
• Bai Tongdong 白彤东, 《Zhi de tanxun 治的探寻》 (The Quest for Order; Bai’s 2026 book on Han Feizi)
• Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
• Confucius’s spiritual autobiography (Analects 2.4; this passage is the topic of episode 5)
• Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics and the Conflicts of Modernity
• Yü Ying-shih 余英時 (1930-2021), author of《宋明理學與政治文化》and《朱熹的歷史世界》
• Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism