Author Archives: Steve Angle

Feb. 1 Columbia Neo-Confucianism Seminar

RE: February 1, 2013 Columbia University Seminar on Neo-Confucian Studies

Dear seminar members and friends,

The next session of the Columbia University Seminar on Neo-Confucian Studies will convene on Friday, February 1, 2013, from 3:30 to 5:30pm. We will meet in the Board Room on the first floor of the Heyman Center for the Humanities at Columbia University. Please note the earlier starting time.

We will have two presenters for this session (listed here in alphabetical order).

Jennifer Eichman will present the paper “Mind Cultivation: Theoretical and Practical Considerations.”

Richard Stichler will present the paper “Human Nature and Cultures of War.”

All are welcome to attend. Please feel free to forward this message to interested colleagues. Please join us after the seminar for dinner at the Columbia Cottage restaurant, which is located on the corner of Amsterdam and 111th Streets.

If you have any questions or would like a copy of the papers, please contact one of our organizers: Yong Huang, (yhuang@kutztown.edu), Tao Jiang (tjiang@rci.rutgers.edu), On-cho Ng (oxn1@psu.edu), or Deborah Sommer (dsommer@gettysburg.edu>).   Our new rapporteur this year is Yang Liu (yl2435@columbia.edu) of Columbia University.

Weber, The Politics of Confucian Political Philosophy

In this guest post, Ralph Weber of the University of Zurich shares with us his English translation of an opinion piece just published in Germany (as “Politik, Konfuzianismus und konfuzianische politische Philosophie in der VR China heute.” In: Widerspruch – Münchner Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Nr. 56, 2013.) Please direct comments to Dr. Weber.

The Politics of ‘Confucian Political Philosophy’

Ralph Weber, University of Zurich

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In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Confucius, the Master, is “standing tall” again, as a People’s Daily headline put it (13 January 2011), referring to a ten meter bronze statue which since January was standing right next to Tiananmen Square in Beijing, before it was dislocated to a less prominent spot in April 2011 for reasons as yet unknown.[1] Not to be mistaken, the statue was not the latest version of the Goddess of Democracy, which students had erected in June 1989 as a symbol of protest and reform. The Confucius statue was not erected against the Chinese government; it had been put there with official endorsement – something that only decades ago would have been unthinkable – and surely it was also dislocated again with official endorsement. The short but prominent appearance of the Confucius statue at one of the most symbolic places in all of China showcases the wavering attitude of the Chinese government on what to do with Confucianism and perhaps reveals once more how split the government is in terms of doctrine and ideology.

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Review of Angle, Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy

NDRP has published a review by BAI Tongdong of Fudan University of my recent book, Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Towards Progressive Confucianism (Polity, 2012). Many thanks to Tongdong for this generous review!

I’d like to take this opportunity to respond very briefly to a couple of the things that Tongdong says in his review. He feels that both Mou Zongsan and I, in our related but separate ways, have left largely unaddressed the question: “can Confucianism make any constructive and systematic contributions to fundamental issues in political philosophy other than being only a “cheerleader” (a sincere one, as Angle tries to show) of liberal democracy?” This is related to some of the other critical remarks he raises late in the review, including the suggestion that in my chapter on human rights, I rest content with the current “responsibility to protect” doctrine, and also Tongdong’s questions about how “Confucian” Progressive Confucianism is.

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Li, Qi, and Transcendence in Neo-Confucianism

This is a guest post by David Chai of the University of Toronto. Please address all questions or comments to him. 

In thinking of a topic to share with all of you, I found myself repeatedly returning to the subject of a new course I am teaching this semester: Neo-Confucianism. While gathering materials for the course I came across an article by Donald Blakeley (“The Lure of the Transcendent in Zhu Xi” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 21.3 (2004): 223-240). The paper discusses whether qi and li should be read as transcendent or immanent. After surveying a variety of contemporary theories, Blakeley argues that “a modified definition of transcendence” is needed such that “that there is independence and self-sufficiency in certain respects but not in others.” (232-233) His conclusion is that “li transcends qi in that any material formations depend upon li. Qi is in a dependent relation to li in this respect and li is independent from qi in this respect. Li, in being what it is as li, is independent from the ongoing affairs in the field of qi. But qi transcends li in that any material formations depend upon qi; li is in a dependent relation to qi in this respect and qi is independent from li in this respect.” (233)

For me, his argument is not convincing for several reasons. First is his need to modify the traditional meaning of transcendence. Second is his very use of transcendence to describe Zhu Xi’s li. From a Daoist perspective, li comes across as being very close to natural law. While Dao is transcendent, its fa, or li, is immanent. For li to possess the same transcendental qualities as Dao would be to deny Dao its own existential nature. So, my question is can li be understood as Blakeley so wishes without the need to modify what is meant by transcendent? If so, how would this play-out in terms of qi’s connection to Dao? On a more fundamental level, can we say Zhu Xi is espousing a cosmogonist doctrine involving qi and li or is he merely putting forth one that is pseudo-cosmological? If the former, then I’d have material with which to conduct a soteriological comparison with Zhuangzi; if the latter, then I am unclear as to the advantages his qi-li dyad holds over the wu-you pairing seen in the texts of Lao-Zhuang.

Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy Spring Schedule

For the spring semester of 2013, the Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy presents the following schedule:

February 8 – Jonathan Gold (Princeton)
March 1 – Sandeep Sreekumar (Baruch College, CUNY)
March 22 – Andrew Lambert (Western New England University)
April 12 – Manyul Im (Fairfield University)
April 26 – Joerg Tuske (Salisbury University)

All meetings held at the Columbia University Department of Religion
5:45-7:45 pm
Rm. 101 in the Department of Religion, 80 Claremont Avenue

Martin Kern at Oxford Workshop on Manuscript and Text Culture

We are pleased to announce the second meeting of the interdisciplinary Workshop on Manuscript and Text Culture (WMTC) at Queen’s, University of Oxford. The paper of the workshop will be given by Martin Kern (Princeton), Astor Visiting Fellow and Fellow Commoner of Queen’s, on Wednesday 30 January at 6 pm in The Queen’s College. The title of the talk is:

‘The “Jinteng” Chapter of the Shangshu and its Newly Discovered Manuscript Version from ca. 300 BCE: Comparison and Methodological Considerations’.

If you are interested in attending, please email: wmtc@queens.ox.ac.uk.

Further information about the workshop can be found here: <http://wmtc.queens.ox.ac.uk/> (The site is still under construction, so please don’t mind its current appearance..)

John Baines (Egyptology)
Charles Crowther (Ancient History/Epigraphy)
Dirk Meyer (Chinese)

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New Issue of Comparative Philosophy

Bou Mou, Editor of Comparative Philosophy, writes to report that the new special issue (volume 4, no.1 / January 2013) of Comparative Philosophy, celebrating the the tenth anniversary of the ISCWP, has been published at the journal website http://www.comparativephilosophy.org.

This special issue consists of five peer-reviewed articles by ISCWP members from different geographic areas in the world, Steve Angle (USA), Chung-I Lin (Taiwan/ROC), Stephen Palmquist (Hong Kong), Henrique Schneider (Austria) and Dean Walsh (USA), together with the “Introduction” by ISCWP President Sor-hoon Tan (Singapore).

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Summer Study on (Comparative) Political Theory

This is a call for applications to the Summer University course on “Religion & Realism in Political Thought”, which will take place at Central European University, Budapest in July 2013. The course targets doctoral students, post-docs, and junior faculty. Candidates with Comparative Political Theory research topics are strongly encouraged to apply. Information is available at http://www.summer.ceu.hu/religion-2013, including information on financial support. Application deadline: 15 February, 2013.

Promising Research Area: Asian Philosophy and Embodied Cognition

One key to successful comparative philosophical research is locating an area in where there is sufficient overlap between different traditions’ approaches that each can see the other as generating relevant challenges or questions, stimulating new ways of framing issues, and so on. I would argue that the “virtue ethics” paradigm has been successful in just this way, bringing together an increasing number of Anglophone and Sinophone philosophers and philosophical projects in fruitful fashion, as judged by the interesting, explicitly work that is being generated by Anglophone scholars (including those with little prior background in Chinese and Chinese philosophy) and some Sinophone thinkers (including those with little prior background in Western philosophy).

Another possible area of overlap and mutual stimulus — though it remains to be seen whether it will generate a similar level of fruitfulness — is virtue epistemology; Michael Chien-kuo Mi and colleagues at Soochow University in Taiwan have been collaborating with Ernie Sosa of Rutgers University and some other Western-trained philosophers in this endeavor.

What I mainly wanted to call attention to here, though, is a third area. The recent APA conference featured a panel (sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies) on “Asian/Comparative Views of the Embodied and Enactive Mind.” Drawing on Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, as well as on various streams of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and phenomenology, the panelists (Bongrae Seok, Matthew MacKenzie, and Bradley Park) made it eminently clear that there is a major area of overlap and many opportunities for mutual stimulus and learning. I was also struck by the fact that a successful NEH Summer Institute was held last summer on this topic; looking at the range of participants and faculty, it is again clear that there is a lot of room for exciting growth in this area of comparative philosophy.

Barnwell on Classical Daoism Part 4.1

Long-time friend of the blog, Scott Barnwell, has posted his fourth installment exploring the question of whether there really is such a thing as “classical Daoism,” over on his blog, Bao Pu. Here are a couple of paragraphs; go over and check it out. Discuss there or here, as you wish — if here, please address all comments to Scott.

The purpose of this 4th essay is to explore these two texts to see what similarities and differences exist. If we understand a “school of thought” (modern Chinese: Xuepai ??) to refer to a system or complex of beliefs, ideas, values and methods, would the various authors of the Laozi and Zhuangzi constitute such a school, as is commonly believed? Or were they two different schools of thought with only slight overlap, perhaps a Laoist school and a Zhuangist school? Is there a “family resemblance” that exists between these two texts that does not between them and others, such as the Mengzi, Mozi, Hanfeizi or Yijing? Jia ?, which commonly meant “house” or “family,” has suggested to Harold Roth that Sima Tan’s use of it “implies that he thought of his six groups as having an important lineage dimension in which masters and disciples functioned according to a family model.”[7] By positing a lineage of masters and disciples (= teachers and students) we come close to the idea of a school (of thought) as well, although whether the contributors to the Laozi and Zhuangzi were two branches of one lineage remains to be seen.

We’ve already explored the nature of ancient Chinese texts and some possible scenarios of how the texts came to be in the earlier essays, especially the 3rd one on Zhuangzi. We have hypothesized that the existence of the Laozi and Zhuangzi required some sort of lineage or group that had compiled and preserved (and added to) these texts, at least until the Han dynasty period where texts were sought out by regional rulers and the imperial government in order to preserve the classical legacy in various libraries. These groups need not have been large, and, further, we do not know if this lineage was unbroken, or whether decades went by where the texts sat neglected in boxes in people’s homes.