Category Archives: Mohism

Harris Reviews Fraser, The Philosophy of the Mozi

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

2017.05.07 View this Review Online   View Other NDPR Reviews

Chris Fraser, The Philosophy of the Mozi: The First Consequentialists, Columbia University Press, 2016, 293pp., $40.00 (pbk), ISBN 9780231149273.

Reviewed by Eirik Lang Harris, City University of Hong Kong

When I was a graduate student casting around for ideas for a dissertation topic, one of my mentors suggested that I find some topic X, generally denigrated in the literature, and formulate an argument of the sort, “X is not as stupid as it sounds.” In an important sense, this is what Chris Fraser has done in examining the early Chinese text the Mozi. He examines the philosophical ideas of the Mohists as they appear in this text and provides not only the most charitable account of their philosophical ideas to appear in any Western language but also the first book length treatment of this text by a philosopher in at least 50 years.

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Perkins Reviews Harris, The Shenzi Fragments

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

2017.03.05 View this Review Online   View Other NDPR Reviews

Eirik Lang Harris, The Shenzi Fragments: A Philosophical Analysis and Translation, Columbia University Press, 2016, 173pp., $55.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780231177665.

Reviewed by Franklin Perkins, University of Hawai’i at Manoa

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PhD opening in Mozi and Yang Zhu Studies at KU Leuven, Sinology

This position is offered in the context of a research project on the creation of Mozi or Yang Zhu from “heretics” into “philosophers.” We are looking for a young MA student in Sinology, Chinese studies, or Chinese philosophy willing to study an epoch in this creation. One’s research focus should be on one of the two figures in one (or more) epochs of the candidate’s choice. For more details, see this attached document.

Report on Mozi Conference

A Report on “Modern Interpretations of Mozi”

Lee Ting-mien (University of Leuven)

The workshop “Modern Interpretation of Mozi,” organized by University of Leuven (KU Leuven), was held on April 3, 4 in 2014. The participants – Annick Gijsbers (University of Leuven), Carine Defoort (University of Leuven), Joachim Kurtz (Heidelberg University), Lee Ting-mien (University of Leuven), Nicolas Standaert (University of Leuven), Nie Tao (University of Leuven and Sichuan University), Qin Yanshi (Sichuan Normal University), Tian Hanyun (Yangzhou University), Xie Qiyang (China University of Political Science and Law), Yvonne Schultz Zinda (University of Hamburg), Zheng Jiewen(Shangdong University) – were scholars and graduate students working on Mozi studies in late-imperial or Republican China. Nine papers were presented on the workshop, beginning in the Ming dynasty and ending in the middle of the 20th century:

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June, 2014 ISCWP Beijing Roundtable

The 2014 Term of the ISCWP’s “Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy” workshop /symposium series is a small-size, half-day workshop on the theme “Mohist Logical Thought and Development of Contemporary Philosophy”, which will be held at Peking University, Beijing, China, 27th June 2014. For more information, click here. Please note that for those interested in possibly presenting at the Roundtable, the deadline for contacting the organizers is June 1, 2014.

Loy on inclusive care and partial virtue

As Steve and Manyul announced last month, with each new issue of Dao the blog will host a discussion of one of the issue’s articles, and the journal will make that article freely available online. Here I’m kicking off the series with a discussion of Loy Hui-chieh’s “On the Argument for Jian’ai” (Dao 12.4, available here).

Loy’s article treats the Mohists’ main argument for inclusive care (jiān ài 兼愛), focusing on the role played in it by appeals to virtues such as filial piety that are inevitably partial. Fundamental to his treatment is the view (which I share) that inclusive care did not require absolute impartiality—it did not imply that we have equal obligations to all people, or that we should treat them the same, or feel the same about them. Loy thus undermines one common sort or argument against the Mohists, that inclusive care is incompatible with the partial virtues and is therefore morally dubious. However, this does not mean that the Mohists’ own appeals to the partial virtues succeed, and Loy goes on to argue that they do not. I’ll sketch Loy’s argument, and then make critical comments on two points.

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